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ARTICLE

Patents, Property, and Prospectivity
Jonathan S. Masur & Adam K. Mortara*
Abstract. W hen judges change the legal rules governing patents, those changes are
always retroactive. That is, they apply equally to patents that have already been granted
and patents that do not yet exist. There are benefits to making a change in the law
retroactive, particularly if the new legal rule is an improvement over what preceded it. But
there are costs as well. Retroactive changes in the law upset reliance interests. This can be
particularly harmful when those reliance interests involve rights or entitlements that
form the basis for substantial financial investment, as is often the case with patents. W hat
is more, judges are aware that their decisions can do violence to existing reliance interests.
This makes judges wary of making changes to patent law in the first place, which can lead
to the law becoming stultified. Reducing the rate of legal change is not an adequate
solution. Neither is takings law, which is commonly applied to solve similar problems that
arise in the context of real property but is a poor fit for intellectual property. Rather, to
ameliorate the reliance concerns generated by legal change, federal judges should be
afforded the latitude to make their rulings purely prospective. And patent judges should
exercise this discretion in the many cases where forward-looking change is called for but
backward-looking change would do more harm than good.
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Introduction
“[Sjuppose that the patent has been in existence without anybody reexamin
ing it fo r 10 years and, moreover, the com pany’s invested $40 billion in
developing it. A n d then suddenly somebody comes in and says: Oh, o h ,. . . we
want it reexamined, not in court but by the Patent Office. Now, that seems
perhaps that it would be a problem . . . ?”
—Justice Stephen Breyer1
“I f I were deciding this case on a blank canvas, I m ight conclude that an
isolated DNA sequence that includes most or all o f a gene is not patentable
subject m atter.. . . B ut we do not decide this case on a blank canvas. Congress
has, fo r centuries, authorized an expansive scope o f patentable subject
m atter.. . . I believe we m ust be particularly wary o f expanding the judicial
exception to patentable subject matter where both settled expectations and
extensive property rights are involved.”
—Judge Kimberly Ann Moore2
Consider the following scenario. The judges of the Federal Circuit are
faced with the question whether a particular type of biologic invention
constitutes patentable subject matter under § 101 of the Patent Act.3 The judges
have become convinced, for reasons of law or policy, that the invention should
not be patentable under § 101.4 But holding as much would mean overturning
decades-old circuit precedent, under which the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO) has granted (and the courts have upheld) tens of thousands of
existing patents. Dozens of major businesses have been founded on the basis of
those patents, and billions of dollars of investment capital have flowed to the
businesses because of them. Changing the law would risk upending the
businesses and, worse, invalidating the patents might deter future investments
in research and development (R&D). Future innovators and investors might be
much more reluctant to pursue patent-based research if they have reason to
fear that the Federal Circuit will pull the rug out from under them.
This problem is fundamental to any area of law in which investment
decisions are made on the basis of expectations regarding the stability and
reliability of legal rights. But it is of particular significance and salience within

1. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29-30, Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s
Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018) (No. 16-712), 2017 W L 8231974.
2. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1343
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (Moore, J., concurring in part), affd in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Ass’n
for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013).
3. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2017).
4. This example is, of course, the scenario addressed by Judge Moore. See supra text
accompanying note 2.
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the realm of patent law.5 Patents exist for the purpose of promoting
innovation,6 and they do so by granting legal rights to innovators that allow
them to capture significant financial returns by making and selling their
inventions.7 If patent rights become unreliable or unstable, the purpose and
function of the patent system will be undermined. Put another way, the
bargain between the government and an inventor is that the latter publicizes
her invention in exchange for a legal monopoly of limited time. If courts later
revoke the inventor’s benefit from that bargain, how likely will she be to enter
into a similar exchange the next time, particularly where trade secret
protection is a practical alternative?8
Moreover, at least in recent years, patent law has undergone a more rapid
series of legal changes than nearly any other area of law, and certainly any
other area of property law. Between 2010 and 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court
decided four major cases that reconfigured the boundaries defining which
types of inventions may be patented and which may not.9 And this merely
scratches the surface; there are many other Supreme Court decisions and
hundreds of appellate cases that have reshaped patent law in various ways.10
An area of law that depends upon legal stability has become notably unstable.
This is the issue described by Justice Breyer and Judge Moore in this
Article’s epigraph. Justice Breyer’s comment, made during oral argument in
5. See Daniel R. Cahoy, Changing the Rules in the M iddle o f the Game: How the Prospective
Application o f Judicial Decisions Related to Intellectual Property Can Promote Economic
Efficiency, 41 Am . BUS. L.J. 1, 21 (2003) (‘‘Although property rights in general merit
special consideration when it comes to retroactivity in judicial decision making, the
case that can be made for intellectual property is even more convincing.”).
6. See U.S. CONST, art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power “to promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”).
7. See, e.g., Benjamin N. Roin, The Case fo r Tailoring Patent A w ards Based on Time-to-Market,
61 UCLA L. REV. 672, 749 (2014) (“[P]atents promote innovation by allowing patentees
to appropriate a greater portion of the social returns from their inventions — ”).
8. This is far from speculative. In fact, there is evidence that the burden of
public disclosure discouraged patenting even before recent upheavals in the
law of patentability. See John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business M ethod
Patent M yth, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 987, 1005 n.51 (2003) (“[M]ost research and
development executives view trade secrets and other means as superior to patents in
appropriating returns on R&D investment.”).
9. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Inti, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354-60 (2014) (holding that many
types of business methods and software inventions may not be patented); Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 590-95 (2013) (holding that
isolated DNA is unpatentable but complementary DNA (cDNA) is patentable); Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 77-80 (2012) (holding that
certain types of diagnostic medical tests are unpatentable); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S.
593,609-12 (2010) (holding that certain business methods are unpatentable).
10. See infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.

966

Patents, Property, and Prospectivity
71 S t a n . L. Rev. 963 (2019)
Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LEG, addresses the
perceived problem created when patents are invalidated via administrative
proceedings before the PTO.11 But the problem is more general: Whenever the
PTO or a court invalidates a patent—or a major change in the law invalidates
thousands of patents—it reduces firms’ incentives to invest in R&D. How
should courts respond in the face of this hazard?13 One option is suggested by
Judge Moore’s concurring opinion in A ssn fo r Molecular Pathology v. United
States Patent & Tradem ark Office. Courts could adhere more rigidly to stare
decisis and simply alter the law less often.13 Yet this approach is often a poor fit
for patent law, where the law must be frequently updated if it is to keep pace
with changes in technology and markets.14 It is also ill-suited to a system in
which only one court of appeals handles patent cases, thus eliminating the
possibility of circuit splits. Without a circuit split to signal the Supreme Court,
long periods of time may pass before the Court addresses important questions
of patent law.15
Another possibility would be for courts to treat changes in patent law that
weaken existing patents as judicial takings that must be compensated. In Stop
the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department o f Environm ental Protection, a
plurality of the Supreme Court held that property can be taken for purposes of
the Takings Clause by judicial decisions that overturn well-established
property rules.16 Applying takings law to patent cases would provide a type of
11. See supra text accompanying note 1; see also Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s
Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018).
12. Our focus in this Article is on the courts—the primary expositors of patent law. But the
point is general to any institution that has a role in shaping patent law. As PTO
Director Andrei Iancu said at his swearing-in ceremony: “[Wje must endeavor to
provide reliable, predictable, and high-quality [intellectual property] rights that give
owners and the public alike confidence in those rights.” Andrei Iancu, Under Sec’y of
Commerce for Intellectual Prop. & Director, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Remarks
at the Ceremonial Swearing-In (Feb. 23, 2018), https://perma.cc/Q7R5-U6CM.
13. See 689 F.3d 1303, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Moore, J., concurring in part), a ffd in part, rev’d
in p art sub nom. M yriad, 569 U.S. 576.
14. See Thomas F. Cotter, A Burkean Perspective on Patent Eligibility, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
855,878-79 (2007) (“Patent law must keep pace with the times....”).
15. There are areas of patent law the Supreme Court has not addressed for quite some time,
including the enablement and written description requirements of § 112 of the Patent
Act. See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1345-47 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(en banc) (citing older Supreme Court cases interpreting § 112); id. at 1364 n * (Rader, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part) (noting that the Supreme Court in a recent
decision hardly purported to resolve the present question” regarding the requirements
of § 112), see also 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2017). Just as A ssn fo r Molecular Pathology v. M yriad
Genetics, Inc. potentially invalidated thousands of patents in a single stroke, see 569 U.S.
at 590-95, so too could a ruling changing the law on written description or enablement.
16. See 560 U.S. 702, 713-15 (2010) (plurality opinion); see also U.S. CONST, amend. V (“[N]or
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”).
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governmental insurance for patentholders and guarantee that courts could not
undermine investment-backed reliance interests by changing the law. Here
too, however, the cure would be worse than the disease. If changes to patent
law were classified as judicial takings, legal change would become impossible
or prohibitively expensive. Takings law could also distort the path of legal
change if judges favor (or disfavor) patents protected by takings law.
A different approach is called for. Instead of stasis or treating changes to
patent law as takings, federal courts—or at least patent courts—should be given
the authority to hand down decisions that are prospective only. That is, they
should have the power to determine that a particular decision affects only
patents whose owners applied for them on or after the date of that decision.
Nonretroactive lawmaking is a mechanism frequently employed by both
Congress and agencies to mitigate the downsides of legal transitions.17
Presenting judges with this option would decouple a judicial decision’s
prospective effect—which is presumptively positive—from the backward
looking harm it might do to investment-backed expectations and reliance
interests. This would provide courts with an avenue for updating legal rules
without doing violence to the stable legal rights necessary to encourage
ongoing investment in R&D. Patent law would become more dynamic and less
hidebound. It would also become more effective.
There is even an existing model for this type of judicial flexibility: the law
of habeas corpus. When the Supreme Court recognizes a constitutional
criminal procedural right, that ruling generally does not apply retroactively to
all prisoners who were convicted under the prior rules. Rather, under the rule
announced by a plurality of the Court in Teague v. Lane 18 and subsequently
codified by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA),19 newly announced procedural rights do not apply to convictions
17. See infra text accompanying notes 166-69. By contrast, courts are by far the dominant
expositors of patent law. Administrative agencies do not have substantive rulemaking
authority within the patent realm, and Congress has not made significant substantive
changes to patent law in over sixty years (the America Invents Act made only a variety
of procedural changes). See Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 Yale L.J.470, 472 (2011),
Jonathan S. Masur, Regulating Patents, 2010 SUP. Ct . Rev. 275, 279; see also Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of the U.S. Code). One of us has argued that this state of affairs should
be altered, with more power afforded agencies to make substantive patent law. See
Masur, Regulating Patents, supra, at 279. For purposes of this Article, however, we take
this institutional arrangement as given.
18. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
19. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2017) (providing that habeas relief is only available when a
state court decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States
(emphasis added)); see also Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-132, § 104,110 Stat. 1214,1218-19 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2254).
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that are already final.20 Thus, when the Supreme Court creates a new rule of
criminal procedure, that rule applies only quasi-prospectively: to future cases
and cases pending on direct appeal, not to the thousands (or tens of thousands)
more in which the conviction is final and the prisoner seeks habeas relief.
Habeas is the only area of law in which quasi-prospective judicial lawmak
ing has become common, but it need not be.21 Indeed, nonretroactive
lawmaking is a staple of legislation and regulation, and thus it pervades most
areas of federal law.22 Patent law, by contrast, is one of the few areas of federal
law governed primarily by judicial decisions rather than statutes or
regulations.23 It makes no sense to deprive the patent system of a critical legal
tool available in so many other legal fields, particularly when this tool’s value
is potentially greatest in the context of patents and the innovation economy.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I analyzes the problems created by
changes in patent law—even changes that produce marked improvements in
the law. Part II considers the possibility that judges should respond by adhering
more strictly to stare decisis and reducing the rate of legal change, eventually
concluding that such a course would be ill-advised. Part III addresses takings
law as a potential solution, rejecting it as an overly rigid and asymmetric
response to a symmetric problem. Finally, Part IV suggests that judges should
solve the problem of damage to investment-backed reliance interests by issuing
purely prospective patent rulings, and then analyzes the costs and benefits of
such an approach.
I.

Patents and Reliance Interests

The goal of patent law is to induce private firms to invest in innovation
and R&D by granting them quasi-monopoly power over their successful
inventions in exchange for public disclosure of those inventions.24 Patents,
20. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 310-11 (plurality opinion). The potential relationship between
habeas law and patent law is discussed more fully in Part IV.C.l below.
21. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 94-99 (1993) (discussing the
circumstances under which retroactivity in civil cases is permitted); see also infra
Part IV.C.1. The qualified immunity defense in civil rights litigation also provides some
mechanism for quasi-prospective lawmaking. Even if a court finds that an asserted
constitutional right exists, defendants can establish immunity by showing that the
right was not “clearly established at the relevant time.” See, e.g., Plumhoff v. Rickard,
134S.Q. 2012,2020(2014).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 166-67.
23. See Masur, Regulating Patents, supra note 17, at 276-77 (expanding upon this point).
24. See Donald S. C hisum et al., Principles of Patent Law 2-3,6 (1998) (explaining this
tradeoff); see also Robert Patrick M erges & J ohn Fitzgerald D uffy, Patent Law
and Policy: Cases and M aterials 253-56 (4th ed. 2007) (describing various incentive
systems believed to drive patent law); Ian Ayres & Gideon Parchomovsky, Tradable
footnote continued on next page
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unlike grants or tax incentives, are ex post rewards—the firm invests resources
first, with the hope that the R&D project will bear fruit and then result in a
patent.25 The patent then allows the firm to recoup its upfront investment
costs and turn a profit by charging higher prices for the patented product or
service.26 Patents can thus solve a public goods problem: Innovation is a public
good, and it is likely to be underproduced if its producers cannot capture the
value of their efforts due to the free riding of others.27
As many commentators have noted, this means that patent law must be
“correct” (or nearly so) if it is to be effective.28 If the law is too lax, and patents
are too easy to obtain, would-be inventors will spend their time on
unproductive projects rather than genuine innovation.29 In addition, the
proliferation of patents on largely worthless inventions might inhibit future
inventors and drive up prices for consumers to such levels that the patents are
doing more harm than good.50 On the other hand, if the law is too strict, and
patents are too hard to obtain, then patents will provide little or no incentive
to would-be inventors and will not encourage additional innovation.31
But it is not enough for the law to be correct. One of the peculiarities of
patent law is that it must also be relatively stable. The reason is the lag time
Patent Rights, 60 STAN. L. Rev. 863, 867 (2007) (explaining how patents involve a
tradeoff between innovation and distortions in price).
25. See Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patent-Prizes Debate, 92 TEX.
L. REV. 303, 308 (2013) (classifying intellectual property incentive systems on the basis
of whether they operate ex ante or ex post, among other dimensions).
26. See Anup Malani & Jonathan S. Masur, Raising the Stakes in Patent Cases, 101 Geo. L.J.
637,642-43(2013).
27. See David S. Olson, T aking the Utilitarian Basis fo r Patent Law Seriously: The Case fo r
Restricting Patentable Subject M atter, 82 TEMP. L. Rev. 181,191 -94 (2009).
28. See, e.g., id. at 193-94 (“Thus it is vitally important that the patent laws be properly
balanced. If the patent laws extend too far, they decrease social utility by allowing more
harm to society from patent monopoly than is gained by promoting new inventions. If
the patent laws provide too little protection for inventions, then social utility is
decreased because inventors do not have adequate incentive to invent.’’); Gideon
Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory o f Intellectual Property,
88 Va. L. Rev. 1455,1504-08 (2002) (suggesting that as patents become too strong or too
weak, they cease to be helpful and become only a drag on innovation).
29. See Stephen Yelderman, The Value o f Accuracy in the Patent System, 84 U. CHI. L. Rev.
1217, 1245-47 (2017) (arguing that granting bad patents will induce firms to substitute
strategic patenting for genuine innovation).
30. See Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects o f Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91
M inn. L. R ev. 101, 119-20 (2006) (describing how invalid patents lead to higher prices
that harm consumers and benefit initial monopolists); Masur, Patent Inflation, supra
note 17, at 479-80 ("Invalid, improperly granted patents can dissuade potential
competitors from entering a market and stunt investment in further research.”).
31. See Yelderman, supra note 29, at 1249 (explaining that denials of patents for otherwise
patentable inventions diminish inventors’ ex ante incentives).
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between R&D investments and patent rewards. A firm invests in R&D with the
belief that some number of years down the road, it will be able to recoup those
investments and turn a profit by leveraging the patents it has obtained.32 Some
types of inventions, such as pharmaceutical drugs, can be valuable even in their
twentieth (and final) year of patent life.33 Accordingly, a pharmaceutical drug
company that embarks on a research project in 2017 must consider what legal
rights it will have in its inventions in 2037 or beyond.
All of this is to say that firms form reliance interests around patents.34
They are willing to invest in R&D at time t\ in reliance on the belief that they
will be able to obtain patents and use those patents to earn profits at time f2.35
Patent law, however, is not fixed in place. It is continually in flux, occasionally
because of changes enacted by Congress,36 but more frequently because of
judicial changes to the common law of patents.37 The Supreme Court alone has

32. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 25, at 310-12, 319-20, 326 (explaining the economics
behind patent-backed investments).
33. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2017) (providing that patents last for twenty years); Lara J.
Glasgow, Stretching the L im its o f Intellectual Property Rights: Has the Pharmaceutical
Industry Gone Too Far?, 41 IDEA 227, 232, 236 (2001) (discussing the substantial financial
blow pharmaceutical companies suffer within months of the expiration of their
patents). Congress recognized this particular problem for pharmaceutical patents
by creating patent term extensions for pharmaceutical products. See Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, sec. 201(a),
§ 156,98 Stat. 1585,1598-602 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 156).
34. See Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, R ethinking Patent L aw ’s Presumption o f Validity,
60 Stan . L. R ev. 45, 52 (2007) (suggesting that patents are presumed valid in part
because of the reliance interests attached to them); see also 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (providing
for a presumption of validity).
35. The argument here centers on a reward theory of patent rights, in which the purpose
of patents is to provide rewards for inventors who have made substantial up-front
investments in developing new technology. This is the leading theory of patents,
which is why we make it our focus. But it is important to note that reliance interests
would loom just as large even if one adopted another theory of patents, such as the
commercialization theory, see generally Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62
Stan. L. Rev. 341 (2010); the coordination theory, see generally Stephen Yelderman,
Coordination-Focused Patent Policy, 96 B.U. L. Rev. 1565 (2016); the prospect theory,
see generally Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function o f the Patent System, 20 J.L. &
ECON. 265 (1977); or the signaling theory, see generally Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69
U. Chi. L. Rev. 625 (2002).
36. See, e.g., Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3, 125 Stat. 284, 285-93
(2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.) (changing U.S. patent
rights from a “first to invent” system to a “first inventor to file” system).
37. See Holly Forsberg, Note, D im inishing the Attractiveness o f Trolling: The Impacts o f Recent
Judicial A ctivity on Non-Practicing Entities, Pitt . J. T ech. L. & Pol’y 12-13 (Fall 2011)
(discussing the recent trend in patent law of judicial change rather than legislative
reform).
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decided forty patent cases since 2005,38 while the Federal Circuit has decided
hundreds of cases during that time, many of which have revised the law in
significant ways.39
Each time a court or Congress changes patent law, it damages these
existing reliance interests. This, in turn, can lead to less R&D investment, as
measured against the baseline of how firms would behave if the law were static.
Paradoxically, the social harm that occurs is not to existing patentholders, the
ones whose legal rights are actually affected. These firms, which possess
patents, have already engaged in the innovation that patent law is meant to
encourage. Their R&D dollars have already been spent. The social good that
patent law is meant to encourage—greater investment in R&D and
innovation—has already occurred within these firms. If a firm’s existing
patents are invalidated or made less valuable, there is certainly private harm to
that firm. But from a static, social perspective, this is just a wealth transfer
from the firm to the general public. No harm has occurred.40
Rather, when the law changes and reliance interests are damaged, the
social harm that occurs is due to the fact that future innovators cannot be
certain that the law will preserve their prospective patent rights. If patent law
is generally unstable, innovative firms (or investors) may fear that they will
never recoup their R&D investments and therefore refrain from making those
investments in the first place. Alternatively, they may hold their innovations
as trade secrets and refrain from sharing them with the public.41 Either of these
38. See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette et al., Supreme Court Patent Cases, W RITTEN DESCRIPTION,
https://perma.cc/2DQV-VQFU (archived Mar. 3,2019). One additional case was argued
in February 2019 and is currently pending before the Supreme Court. See Transcript of
Oral Argument, Return Mail, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 17-1594 (U.S. Feb. 19, 2019),
2019 W L 719101.
39. See U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed. Circuit, Year-to-Date Activity as of December 31,
2017 (n.d.), https://perma.cc/6TLG-8C5M. For significant examples, see Ariad
Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (written
description requirement); Janssen Pharmaceutica N.V. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. (In re
’318 Patent Infringement Litig.), 583 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (enablement require
ment); Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (damages); and
Phillips v. AWF1 Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (claim construction).
40. This follows from the fact that patents represent a tradeoff between dynamic efficiency
(innovation) and static inefficiency (monopoly prices, hold-up concerns, and so forth).
See Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 28, at 1504-08. If the innovation has already
occurred, then the dynamic efficiency has already been realized. Invalidating the patent
at that point imposes no further social harm.
41. See Neil M. Goodman, Note, Patent Licensee Standing and the Declaratory Judgm ent Act, 83
Colum. L. Rev. 186, 212-13 (1983). A trade secret is a relevant piece of business
information that a firm elects to maintain as a secret, rather than sharing it with the
public (as is a precondition of obtaining a patent). See id. Trade secrets can, in theory,
last indefinitely if the secret is never discovered. Id. at 213. But they can also evaporate
quickly if a member of the public is able to reverse engineer the product and learn the
secret.

972

Patents, Property, and Prospectivity
71 Stan . L. Rev. 963 (2019)

approaches would slow the pace of technological advancement. An unstable
patent law threatens to reinstate the problem of public goods and free riding
that motivates patent law in the first place.
There are clear analogies to the law of real property and to industrial
regulation that are instructive and highly relevant. Imagine that a firm is
considering building a factory on a piece of land it owns that is zoned for
industrial use. The upfront cost of the factory is large, but the firm expects to
recoup the cost and turn a profit by selling the goods produced in the factory
over a twenty-year period. Of course, if at some point in the subsequent twenty
years the firm were to be stripped of its ownership interest in the land on
which the factory is built, the firm’s investment in the factory would be
destroyed and the firm would suffer a substantial loss. Likewise for the zoning
rule—if the property were to be rezoned for only residential use, preventing
the factory from operating, the firm would be harmed.42 The firm is willing to
make the upfront investment of constructing the factory only if it is confident
that the laws governing its property will remain relatively stable over time.43
Similarly, imagine that a particular Chemical X is essential to the produc
tion processes planned for this factory. Chemical X is currently thought to be
quite safe and is regulated only loosely. It is always possible, however, that
scientists will learn at some point that Chemical X is in fact quite dangerous,
and that the Environmental Protection Agency or the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration will move to regulate it more stringently 44 If the firm
is required to install safety equipment or take other precautions, this will eat
into its profits but not destroy the value of its investment; if Chemical X is
banned entirely, the value of the factory will be lost. Here, too, the firm is
reliant upon relative stability in the regulatory regime surrounding
Chemical X, which potentially involves both legal uncertainty and scientific

42. See Cullen Christie Wilkerson, Comment, Just Compensation for Temporary Regulatory
Takings: A Discussion of Factors Influencing Damage Awards, 35 Emory L.J. 729, 765-72
(1986) (discussing the economic harm from rezoning property after it has been
developed).
43. See Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54
Duke L.J. 1, 26 (2004) (“[Property creates incentives for development by identifying
those who have claims to particular resources and thereby ensuring that they can
appropriate the fruits of their efforts to cultivate these resources.”).
44. See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Unquantified Benefits and the Problem of
Regulation Under Uncertainty, 102 CORNELL L. Rev . 87, 119-25 (2016) (describing how
regulators may assess the use of a harmful pollutant in the workplace).
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uncertainty (that is, the possibility that new facts regarding the dangerousness
of Chemical X will be discovered).45 The same dynamics apply with respect to
patent law.46
Importantly, legal instability can upset reliance interests and create
problems of inadequate investment regardless of whether the change in the law
is generally helpful or harmful. What matters are the expectations of the
private firms that make investment decisions 47 So long as a change in the law
leads them to believe that other changes may be forthcoming and may
negatively affect their future investments, they will be more inclined to refrain
from making those investments. For instance, consider the Supreme Court’s
2012 decision in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., which
invalidated certain types of medical diagnostic tests as unpatentable under
§ 101 of the Patent Act48 Let us stipulate that Mayo was rightly decided as a
matter of policy—that the patent system will function better if these types of
inventions are not patentable.49 Firms that observe the Mayo decision might
nonetheless conclude that the courts will render further decisions of this type
in the future, decisions in which they declare certain types of inventions

45. Private insurance against legal change or uncertainty is essentially impossible to
obtain. See Jonathan S. Masur & Jonathan Remy Nash, The Institutional D ynam ics o f
Transition Relief, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 391,408 (2010).
46. This is particularly the case in certain fields, such as biotechnology. For example, the
ability to satisfy the written description requirement by depositing an actual specimen
of biological material has been hotly contested. See, e.g., Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. GenProbe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 960-61, 963-67 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that such a deposit
satisfies the written description requirement). The Supreme Court has not addressed
whether deposits can satisfy the written description requirement, and if it overturned
the Federal Circuit on this subject retroactively, the decision would likely have a
profound effect on the biotechnology industry. That is, of course, if the Supreme Court
agrees that a separate written description requirement even exists. Cf. Ariad
Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Rader, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part) (arguing that there is no such separate
requirement).
47. See Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: A n Equilibrium Approach, 110 H a r v . L.
R e v . 1055, 1105 (1997) (describing the relationship between private parties' expecta
tions and their behavior).
48. See 566 U.S. 66,72 (2012).
49. This is debatably true. Compare, e.g., Bernard Chao, M oderating Mayo, 107 Nw. U. L.
R e v . C o l l o q u y 82, 99 (2012) (supporting the decision), with, e.g., Gene Quinn, Killing
Industry: The Supreme Court Blows Mayo v. Prometheus, IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 20, 2012),
https://perma.cc/FZ5U-8DL8 (criticizing the decision), and Michael Risch, Patentable
Subject Matter, the Supreme Court, and Me, MADISONIAN (Mar. 20, 2012), https://perma.cc
/8PB2-2ZW 4 (same).
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unpatentable and thus upend reliance interests.50 If firms fear that the
innovations they produce will lose value due to future changes in the law, they
will reduce their investments in R&D accordingly.
However, this certainly does not mean that changes to the law are always
bad. If a particular legal doctrine is doing substantially more harm than good,
the value of changing that doctrine may vastly outweigh the cost of unsettling
expectations. Again, the analogy to real property and regulation is instructive.
Imagine that, per the example above, scientists discover that even low doses of
Chemical X are toxic. Banning Chemical X will harm the reliance interests of
firms that are using it, and the change in the law will create uncertainty that
may dampen future investment. But these negative considerations are dwarfed
by the value of eliminating a harmful toxin .51 As a general matter, the effects of
instability on investment should be thought of as a cost to legal change.52 That
cost may be large in some cases and small in others; it may be outweighed by
other benefits from the legal change in some cases and not in others. But it will
exist nearly any time the law is altered.
Changes to patent law most evidently produce investment-related costs
when courts invalidate existing patents and narrow the scope of what is
patentable. But in fact, any type of decision that affects patent law can damage
reliance interests. For instance, a judicial decision reducing the amount of
damages that can be collected in infringement suits would diminish the value
of the affected patents.53 If the reduction in damages is substantial enough, it
could affect firms’ investment decisions.54
Perhaps even more critically, the concerns are symmetric: Judicial deci
sions that strengthen patents can harm reliance interests just as much as
decisions that weaken patents. To illustrate, imagine a firm that copies the
50. This outcome has plausibly occurred, see Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788
F.3d 1371, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (invalidating a patent on a prenatal diagnostic test),
sparking criticism, see, e.g., Dennis Crouch, In Brief. Am ici Provide Reasons to Reconsider
Ariosa v. Sequenom, Patently - 0 (Aug. 30,2015), https://perma.cc/ECT2-EXFM.
51. See Masur & Posner, supra note 44, at 125 (explaining how these types of costs and
benefits should be weighed).
52. See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, Property’s Morale, 110 MICH. L. Rev. 437, 439-41 (2011)
(describing the way in which people can experience harm and incur costs when their
property rights are upset, or if they believe those rights are unstable).
53. See, e.g., Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1336-39 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(curtailing the circumstances in which courts may use the “entire market value rule” to
assess patent damages, and thus reducing the damages that patent plaintiffs will
receive).
54. On the whole, however, invalidity (and validity) decisions will probably have a greater
impact on reliance interests, because they can affect the full value of a patent.
Infringement (or noninfringement) decisions will usually have only a fractional impact
on patent value, such as if they slightly narrow the scope of the patent or limit the
amount of damages available.
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business model of a competitor. The firm believes—correctly, for the
moment—that business models cannot be patented, and thus that it cannot be
sued for patent infringement by the competitor.55 If the courts were to change
the law and allow patents on business methods, the reliance interests of this
firm would be destroyed, no less than if its own patents had been invalidated.56
Freedom to operate can be just as valuable as the patent-based right to
exclude.57 Of course, in many cases the reliance interests of these types of firms
will nonetheless be protected by other provisions of patent law. For instance,
once a firm has been publicly using a process or producing a good for more
than one year, that process or good can no longer be patented, and other firms
using it can no longer lose their freedom to operate.58 But there may be many
cases in which allowing new types of patents or strengthening existing patents
does violence to investment incentives in ways that patent law does not
otherwise prevent. Here, it is the fear that patent law will expand and become
more powerful that might diminish future investment by firms that do not
seek patents.
How should courts behave in the face of these concerns? How should they
behave when any given instance of legal change creates systemic costs? One
option is to simply refrain from altering the law, or at least to reduce the rate at
which they do so. That possibility is the subject of the next Part.
II. Reliance Interests and the Preservation of the Status Quo
If legal change harms reliance interests and diminishes investment
incentives, one solution is for judges to enforce consistency and stability in the
law—or at least to place a thumb on the scale in favor of the status quo. In fact,
this approach is as old as the common law itself. Stare decisis is founded on this

55. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612-13 (2010) (holding that certain types of business
methods are unpatentable).
56. In fact, business methods were unpatentable until the Federal Circuit held that business
methods were patentable in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.
See 149 F.3d 1368,1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir.
2008), a ffd sub nom. Bilski, 561 U.S. 593.
57. See Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and
Its Implications fo r the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297,303-04 (2010).

58. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2017).
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principle: Courts are advised to adhere to precedent when in doubt so as not to
upset settled reliance interests.59 The consequence is that courts will often shy
away from making substantial legal changes, even when they would have
reached a different outcome if they were considering the issue as a matter of
first impression.60 Even during a period of rapid legal change, such as patent
law has experienced over the past decade, courts may shy away from altering
the law in ways that seem too sudden or consequential.
Examples of such judicial reticence can be found throughout the law,61 and
patent law is no exception. One notable instance is Judge Moore’s concurring
opinion in Assn for Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent & Trademark
Office, a portion of which appears in this Article’s epigraph.62 That famous case
involved the patentability of isolated sequences of DNA and complementary
DNA (cDNA).63 In her opinion, Judge Moore argued that both isolated DNA
and cDNA were patentable, in large part because of the reliance interests that

59. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (“Considerations in favor of stare
decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights, where reliance
interests are involved....”); see also Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Reliance, 62 EMORYL.J.
1459, 1460 (2013) (noting that the principle of stare decisis is thought to be based on
concern for reliance interests).
60. See Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis in the Second-Best W orld, 103 Calif. L. Rev. 1139,1190-91
(2015) (explaining how stare decisis can lead to outcomes that are inferior to those that

would have been reached had a court been considering the question as a matter of first
impression); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory o f Constitu
tional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. Rev . 1189, 1261 (1987) (“Though precedents can be
rejected based on arguments from text and the framers’ intent, this seldom happens.
The cases take on a significance of their own.”).
61. Perhaps the most famous application of stare decisis is the Supreme Court’s decision in
Planned Parenthood o f Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, in which the Court upheld the
right to abortion it had announced in Roe v. W ade in part because of the reliance
interests that had formed around that prior decision. See Planned Parenthood of
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992) (“The inquiry into reliance counts the cost of a
rule’s repudiation as it would fall on those who have relied reasonably on the rule’s
continued application.”); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
62. See 689 F.3d 1303,1343 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Moore, J., concurring in part), a ffd in part, rev'd
in part sub nom. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576
(2013); supra text accompanying note 2.
63. See Ass'n fo r Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1309. Isolated DNA consists of DNA
sequences that code for particular genes that have been separated from surrounding
biological materials and from the DNA sequences on either side of them. See Stephen H.
Schilling, Note, D N A as Patentable Subject M atter and a Narrow Framework fo r Addressing
the Perceived Problems Caused by Gene Patents, 61 Duke L.J. 731, 749-52 (2011). Isolated
cDNA refers to isolated DNA sequences from which the introns—the base pairs that do
not contain any usable genetic information—have been removed. See id. at 749-50. Both
types can form the basis for significant biotechnology inventions. See id. at 752.
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had been built up over the decades during which courts and the PTO had
allowed patents on these types of inventions.64 Wrote Judge Moore:
If I were deciding this case on a blank canvas, I might conclude that an isolated
DNA sequence that includes most or all of a gene is not patentable subject
m atter.. . . But we do not decide this case on a blank canvas. Congress has, for
centuries, authorized an expansive scope of patentable subject matter. Likewise,
the United States Patent Office has allowed patents on isolated DNA sequences for
decades, and, more generally, has allowed patents on purified natural products for
centuries. There are now thousands of patents with claims to isolated DNA, and
some unknown (but certainly large) number of patents to purified natural
products or fragments thereof. . . . I believe we must be particularly wary of
expanding the judicial exception to patentable subject matter where both settled
expectations and extensive property rights are involved.65

The Supreme Court would eventually disagree with this portion of Judge
Moore’s opinion, holding in A ss’n fo r Molecular Pathology v. M yriad Genetics, Inc.
that isolated DNA is not patentable.66 But Judge Moore’s concerns were
legitimate, and she was exactly right to factor them into her decision. In a
vacuum, Judge Moore might well have believed that isolated DNA should not
be patentable, but she was not operating in a vacuum.67
For every case such as M yriad, in which the Supreme Court was willing to
forge ahead with legal change despite the potential harm to reliance interests,
there are others in which the final court to consider the issue stayed its hand
and adhered to precedent. One example is Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu K inzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., which concerned prosecution history estoppel.68 In an earlier
case addressing the same issue, W arner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.,
the Supreme Court had noted the importance of maintaining consistent
doctrinal standards over time on an issue that was central to many parties
64. See A ss’n fo r Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1343 (Moore, J., concurring in part).
65. Id. (footnote omitted).
66. See 569 U.S. at 580 (holding that isolated DNA is unpatentable but cDNA is patentable).
67. M yria d represents an especially damaging type of retroactive legal change. Isolated
genomic DNA patent claims prior to M yriad had value, but much of that value could
be equally captured by claims to cDNA arising from the same inventive work.
See Jessica L.A. Marks et al., Gene Patents W o n ’t Disappear Post-Myriad, FINNEGAN
(July 22, 2013), https://perma.cc/4SEL-X5WB. The Supreme Court in M yriad held that
cDNA claims were patentable. See 569 U.S. at 580. Imagine a patent-owning firm with
claims to isolated genomic DNA that could have, but did not, include a claim for a
cDNA sequence. That patentholder would have been dramatically affected by M yriad
all because of an accident of claim drafting. It might have relied on the PTO and Federal
Circuit’s view that isolated DNA was patentable. But once the Supreme Court decided
otherwise, the patentee’s opportunity for claiming the cDNA invention would have
passed, leaving the firm with no recourse. Cf. David L. Schwartz, Retroactivity at the
Federal Circuit, 89 IND. L.J. 1547, 1553-55 (2014) (explaining the retroactive effects of
patent decisions).
68. See 535 U.S. 722,726 (2002).
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within the patent system.69 In Festo, which followed five years later, the Court
doubled down on this idea. It admonished the Federal Circuit for “ignor[ing]
the guidance of W arner-Jenkinson, which instructed that courts must be
cautious before adopting changes that disrupt the settled expectations of the
inventing community.”70
In the years since, the Federal Circuit has cited Festo’s argument for
maintaining the legal status quo in a legion of cases. One notable example is
A riad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., a case that concerned the written
description requirement.71 Wrote the en banc court:
In addition to the statutory language and Supreme Court precedent supporting
the existence of a written description requirement separate from enablement,
stare decisis impels us to uphold it now .... [T]o change course now would disrupt
the settled expectations of the inventing community, which has relied on it in
drafting and prosecuting patents, concluding licensing agreements, and rendering
validity and infringement opinions. As the Supreme Court stated in admonishing
this court, we “must be cautious before adopting changes that disrupt the settled
expectations of the inventing community.”77

The en banc Federal Circuit took a similar tack in Lighting Ballast
Control LLC v. Philips Electronics North America C orp.P a case concerning the
(relatively narrow) question of the standard of review for claim construction.74

69. See 520 U.S. 17, 28 (1997) (“[T]he lengthy history of the doctrine of equivalents strongly
supports adherence to our refusal . . . to find that the Patent Act conflicts with that
doctrine.”).
70. 535 U.S. at 739 (citing W arner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 28).
71. See 598 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). The written description requirement
demands that an inventor demonstrate in the patent application that she is “in
possession” of the invention—in the sense of having invented it and having recognized
inventing it at the time of invention—before she can receive a patent. See id. at 1355.
The necessary disclosure is that which a person of ordinary skill in the art would
recognize as sufficient to convey possession of the invention, and not a subjective
inquiry into what the inventor did or did not know. See id. at 1351.
72. Id. at 1347 (quoting Festo, 535 U.S. at 739).
73. 744 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc). The Supreme Court later vacated the Federal
Circuit’s decision and remanded for reconsideration in light of Teva Pharmaceuticals
USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015). See Lighting Ballast Control LLC v.
Universal Lighting Techs., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1173 (2015) (mem.).
74. See Lighting Ballast Control, 744 F.3d at 1281. Claim construction is the procedure in
which a court interprets a patent claim and defines its legal meaning, similar to how a
court might interpret a statute. See generally Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
517 U.S. 370 (1996) (describing the process and legal rules governing claim construc
tion).
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The court again quoted Festo to explain its unwillingness to change the existing
standard:
Stare decisis embraces procedural as well as substantive precedent. Procedures in
the litigation-prone arena of patent rights can affect the cost, time, and
uncertainty of litigation, and in turn affect economic activity founded on the
presence or absence of enforceable patents. Courts should be “cautious before
adopting changes that disrupt the settled expectations of the inventing
community.

Yet another example comes from Immersion Corp. v. H TC Corp., a case that
concerned the extent to which a patent application filed as a continuation of an
earlier application could claim the filing date of the earlier application.76 The
Federal Circuit held that a continuation application may claim the filing date
of a parent application if the continuation is filed on the same day the parent
application issues, as had been the PTO’s practice for “half a century.”77 Again,
the court cited concern for reliance interests as a reason for preserving a
longstanding standard. It explained that “the repeated, consistent . . . judicial
and agency interpretations, in this area of evident public reliance, provide a
powerful reason to read [the statute] to preserve, not upset, the established
position.”78 As the court noted, “[i]nvestment-backed expectations and reliance
interests in patent law are often strong.”79 These are merely a few prominent
examples of patent cases in which courts’ concern for reliance interests played
some role in decisions to preserve the legal status quo. Other such cases
abound.80

75. L ighting Ballast Control, 744 F.3d at 1283 (citation omitted) (quoting Festo, 535 U.S.
at 739).
76. See 826 F.3d 1357,1359,1361 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
77. See id. at 1362-65.
78. Id. at 1365.
79. Id. at 1364 (citing Festo, 535 U.S. at 739).
80. See, e.g., STC.UNM v. Intel Corp., 767 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Dyk, J.,
concurring in the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc) (“The rule against
involuntary joinder is well established. Changing that rule would upset settled
expectations.”); Hyatt v. Doll, 576 F.3d 1246, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (referencing reliance
interests and stare decisis as reasons for the outcome the court reached), vacated
on grant o f reh’g en banc sub nom. Hyatt v. Kappos, 366 F. App’x 170 (Fed. Cir. 2010);
Masco Corp. v. United States, 303 F.3d 1316,1327 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (declining to apply a
statutory provision in a way that would “disrupt patentees’ settled expectations
regarding the scope of their claims”). B ut see, e.g., SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v.
First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 954, 968-71 (2017) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(arguing that stare decisis compelled interpreting the Patent Act to include a laches
defense); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 976-77 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Newman, J., dissenting)
(arguing that stare decisis and concern for reliance interests should have compelled the
court to uphold the validity of business method patents), a ffd sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos,
561 U.S. 593(2010).
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Of course, this is not proof that concerns for investment-backed expecta
tions were dispositive in these cases. Courts frequently pay lip service to
various arguments when they would have reached the same outcome
regardless.81 However, it seems quite likely that in at least some of these cases,
the courts reached outcomes because of stare decisis and the fear of upsetting
reliance interests that they would not have reached had the case been one of
first impression. Judge Moore’s concurring opinion in Ass’n fo r Molecular
Pathology is the most notable such example, because she wrote separately
specifically to make the point about reliance interests and because she noted
explicitly that her vote might have been different had she been writing on a
blank slate.82 But she is almost surely not the only judge to have reasoned along
these lines.
It is not necessarily good or bad (from the perspective of social welfare) for
judges to refrain from changing the law out of concern for reliance interests.
As noted in Part I above, reliance interests in patent law are valid concerns, and
courts should be wary of upsetting them to such a degree that patent-based
investment in R&D begins to diminish. At the same time, there is an
unavoidable tradeoff: If courts are not making necessary changes to the law,
then the positive value of updating the law is lost. The result can be legal
stultification. This is particularly salient in the context of patent law, where
changes in technology and markets can render legal rules outdated at a faster
rate than in other legal contexts.83
The primary concern is that courts will err in the direction of the status
quo, failing to change the law in some circumstances when the benefits of
doing so would outweigh the costs. A related concern is that the PTO’s zeal in
81. See, e.g., Daniel M. Friedman, Expenses of Corporate Proxy Contests, 51 COLUM. L. R ev . 951,
952 (1951) (“The distinction between policy and personnel, however, is an artificial one,
and the very courts that pay lip service to the doctrine recognize its dubious validity.”
(footnote omitted)); William H. Simon, Transparency Is the Solution, Not the Problem:
A Reply to Bruce Green, 60 Sta n . L. R ev . 1673,1685 (2008) (responding to Bruce A. Green,
The Market for Bad Legal Scholarship: William H. Simon’s Experiment in Professional
Regulation, 60 Stan . L. R ev . 1605 (2008)) f‘[T]he court system pays lip service to values
of public access, but it compromises these values. . . . ”); Cass R. Sunstein, Essay, Beyond
Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 Yale L.J. 2580, 2608 (2006)
(“Though the Supreme Court has not invoked the nondelegation doctrine to invalidate
a federal statute since 1935, the Court continues to pay lip service to the doctrine and to
hold it in reserve for extreme cases.” (footnote omitted)).
82. See 689 F.3d 1303,1343 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Moore, J., concurring in part), affd in part, rev’d
in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576
(2013).
83. See Rafael X. Zahralddin, Note, The Effect of Broad Patent Scope on the Competitiveness of
United States Industry, 17 D el . J. C orp . L. 949, 995 (1992) (explaining that rapid develop
ment in technology is not taken into account in patent law, to the detriment of
innovation).
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granting patents of a certain type could itself become the reason that those
types of inventions are deemed patentable, if thousands of patents have already
issued. Thus, an excessive focus on reliance interests could have the effect of
placing too much power in the hands of the PTO.84 Importantly, reluctance to
alter the law out of fear of upsetting reliance interests is a self-reinforcing
phenomenon—a positive-feedback cycle. A willingness on the part of the PTO
to grant patents, and a willingness on the part of the courts to uphold them,
will beget more such patents. Those patents will in turn beget even stronger
reliance interests. If courts do not change the law as quickly as would be
optimal for fear of harming established interests, the law can persist in a
suboptimal state indefinitely. And reliance interests will not necessarily fade
over time. To the contrary—in many cases, the longer reliance interests persist,
the more entrenched they become, and the more that private parties learn to
rely on them.
Consider Myriad, for example. If the Supreme Court had allowed the
patents on isolated DNA to stand,85 firms would have continued to file for
those patents, and the PTO would have continued to grant them. The number
of such patents would have continued to grow, as would the extent to which
businesses relied upon those patents. The reliance interests would have been no
weaker ten years later than they were when M yriad was decided. This pattern
would reverse only if some exogenous shock caused the industry as a whole to
fade or the importance of patents within the industry to diminish. Such a shock
is of course possible, but it is not something that courts—or anyone else—can
predict.
To summarize, the costs of upsetting reliance-based interests are real, and
courts are right to take those costs into account. In some cases, these concerns
will lead courts to refrain from changing the law, even when they believe that
the law is not optimally calibrated. In many cases, courts are likely privileging
the status quo to a greater extent than they should, leading to harmful legal
ossification. But even when courts are deciding cases optimally, they cannot
escape the costs of either (1) changing the law and thereby damaging
investment-based expectations, or (2) preserving the status quo and thereby

84. Cf. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1344-45 (Moore, J., concurring in part)
(explaining that the fact that the PTO has granted numerous patents over a substantial
period of time provides an argument against changing the law); Masur, Regulating
Patents, supra note 17, at 278-79 (describing the balance of power between the PTO and
the Federal Circuit and discussing which institution should be the prime mover in
patent law).
85. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
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forgoing the benefits of legal change. What is needed is some mechanism for
protecting existing reliance interests while simultaneously allowing the courts
to make productive updates to patent law. The following Part considers one
possible mechanism.
III. Takings and Patent Retroactivity
Evolution in patent law, whether incremental or momentous, imposes
costs on the private parties that rely upon the law. At the outset, those costs are
privately borne, but they can metastasize into significant social harm if they
induce private parties to reduce their R&D, or to eschew patents and rely
instead on trade secret protection. Even worse, courts that attempt to take
these costs into account will sometimes end up stultifying the law, to the
detriment of the entire patent system. The goal of policymakers within the
patent system should be to find a means of permitting updates to the law while
simultaneously protecting existing reliance interests to the degree necessary to
encourage continued investment.
This is the set of problems that takings law is meant to address. The Fifth
Amendment provides that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use,
without just compensation.”86 If the government seizes private property
without providing just compensation, the government seizure is considered
null and void.87 Takings law functions (in part) to protect reliance interests by
ensuring that the property on which those interests are based is not seized or
destroyed without the owner being compensated for her loss.88 In that sense, it
is a type of government-provided insurance. At the same time, takings law does
not prevent legal change, even change that would destroy property. The law
can always be adjusted, even in ways that would confiscate or destroy property,
so long as just compensation is paid. Accordingly, it is worth considering
takings law as a solution to the problem of legal instability in patent law.
When a court changes patent law to the detriment of some preexisting
interests, should the legal change be considered a judicial taking of the parties’
patent rights? This Part takes up that question, first from a normative and then
from a descriptive perspective.

86. U.S. Const , amend. V.
87. See, e.g., Reg’l Rail R eorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102,124-25 (1974).
88. See Joseph W illiam Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 Stan . L. R ev 611 737-39
(1988).
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A. The Normative Case for and Against Applying Takings Law to
Patents
At first glance, takings law would seem to be a fitting solution to the
problem of legal instability in the patent context. In critical respects, the
principles that underlie takings law mirror the concerns that arise when
patent law is changed. First, takings law creates stable expectations for
individuals and firms in order to induce them to invest in improving their
property.89 Recall the prior example of a firm that owns a plot of land and is
considering building a factory.90 If the government could seize the land
without compensation, the firm would be reluctant to construct the factory,
fearing that it will pay for the investment and then reap none of the rewards.91
Takings law thus acts as a type of social insurance against legal changes that
might upset reliance interests.92
These concerns apply equally to patent law. The R&D necessary to
generate patentable inventions can be costly, and in many cases firms are
unlikely to undertake that R&D without the promise of enforceable patents.93
When the government invalidates existing patents through legal change, firms
take note, and estimate a lower likelihood that they will be able to enforce their
patents and use them to earn profits in the future.94 The likely result is that
firms will reduce investment in R&D, solely due to diminished confidence in
their ability to rely on the patent rights they obtain.

89. See R ichard A. P osner , E conomic A nalysis of La w § 3.1, at 40-41 (8th ed. 2011);
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory o f Property, 90 CORNELL L. R ev . 531,
606-07 (2005); Davidson, supra note 52, at 453.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
91. See POSNER, supra note 89, § 3.1, at 40-41 (explaining th a t pro p erty rights are necessary

for investment).
92. See Singer, supra note 88, at 737-39.
93. There are of course means other than patents for funding or inducing innovation, see
Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 25, at 307, but there is no question that patents account
for a significant proportion of all innovation.
94. Evidence that this is taking place can be found in the reactions by firms to major patent
decisions. See, e.g., JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42815, M ayo V.
Prometheus Implications for Patents , Biotechnology , and P ersonalized
M edicine 9 (2012) (noting the harm to medical diagnostic firms from the M ayo

decision); Alexa Johnson, Note, A Crisis o f Patent Law and Medical Innovation
The Category o f Diagnostic Claims in the W a ke o f Ariosa v. Sequenom, 27 H ealth
M atrix 435, 437-38 (2017); Charlotte Edwards, N u-M ed Optimistic About N itric Oxide
Prospects A fter Patent Ruling, V erdict M ed . D evices (Aug. 16, 2018), https://perma.cc
/X57Y-QKXQ.
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A similar analysis applies even after patents are granted. Patents are
analogous to undeveloped real property .95 The patent is only as valuable as its
owner makes it; she must transform the invention embodied in the patent into
a product or service with real market value. Yet this process is often expensive,
particularly for certain types of inventions (such as pharmaceuticals), and in
some cases firms will be reluctant to undertake the necessary investments
without the assurance of substantial profits, which patents are supposed to
provide.96 Unforeseen changes in the law can thus diminish firms’ willingness
to invest in commercializing their patented inventions, just as the prospect of
uncompensated takings could make owners of real property reluctant to
construct factories or make other improvements.97
Second, takings law forces the government to internalize the costs of its
projects and distribute those costs among a larger number of taxpayers.9®
Suppose the government were considering constructing a public park on land
currently occupied by four private homes. Ideally, the government would
balance the benefits of the park against the costs of the lost homes and only
pursue the project if its benefits exceeded its costs. But if the government could
simply seize the property, it could externalize the costs onto the four
homeowners who would lose their houses.99
Requiring the government to compensate these homeowners for the
taking of their houses changes the equation. The government must pay that
compensation out of tax revenues, meaning that many of the same people who
benefit from the park will also bear its costs.100 If the park’s beneficiaries will
bear its costs as well, they are more likely to favor the project only when its
benefits exceed its costs, and more likely to force the government to act
accordingly.101
Here, the analogy to patent law is not as exact. To be sure, Congress or an
executive branch agency might “take” a patent by infringing it, thus
95. See F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85
Minn. L. Rev. 697,710 (2001) (explaining that without patents, many inventions might
remain undeveloped).
96. See id.
97. See Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for Regulatory
Takings, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 677, 714-16 (2005) (suggesting that property owners should
be partially but not entirely compensated for takings).
98. See id. at 705-06, 727-28; see also Thomas W. Merrill, Incomplete Compensation
for Takings, 11 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 110, 131-33 (2002) (suggesting that the goal of
encouraging the government to internalize the cost of its projects might support a
system of incomplete compensation for takings).
99. See Serkin, supra note 97, at 705-06.
100. See id. at 724-28 (describing how takings force costs to be shared across a tax base).
101. See id. at 704-05 (describing the benefits of cost internalization).

985

Patents, Property, and Prospectivity
71 Stan. L. Rev. 963 (2019)

externalizing the costs of a government project onto a single actor.102 But those
sorts of actions are not the subject of interest here; judicially driven legal
change is. Courts do not quite pursue “projects” in the same sense as a
legislature or executive might, and courts do not control taxes or spending.
Nor are courts politically accountable in the sense that they must weigh costs
and benefits and suffer the consequences if they do not strike the balance
appropriately.103 At the same time, we do want judges who decide patent cases
to attempt (so far as they can) to account for the costs and benefits of their
decisions. Judges should not be making law while looking only at the benefits
of a decision and ignoring its costs.104 Similarly, while judges would not be
responsible for paying compensation in the event of a taking, there is evidence
that judges are responsive to views within elite legal circles regarding the
optimal development of the law.105 There is reason to believe that judges will
render decisions in such a fashion as to maximize their standing within these
circles.106 Having to pay compensation for invalidated patents might change
this calculus among patent stakeholders, and thus among patent judges.107
At the same time, there are very strong considerations counseling against
applying takings law to patents or any other system of legal change. The most
significant is the cost of legal change. A new legal rule that invalidates
thousands of existing patents could lead to claims against the government for
billions of dollars or more.108 Adjudicating the claims would also be incredibly
102. This frequently occurs in the context of Department of Defense contracts with private
defense firms. See generally Timothy R. Wyatt, In Search of Reasonable Compensation.
Patent Infringement by Defense Contractors with the Authorization and Consent of the U.S.
Government, 20 FED. ClR. B.J. 79 (2010).
103. Executive agencies are required to conduct cost-benefit analyses, see Exec. Order
No. 12,866, § 1, 3 C.F.R. 638, 638-40 (1993), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at
94,95 (2017), but no such limit is placed on the courts.
104. See generally Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the judicial
Role, 85 U. Chi. L. Rev. 935 (2018) (describing the role that judges should play in
evaluating cost-benefit analyses).
105. See generally Colleen V. Chien, Patent Amicus Briefs: What the Courts’Friends Can Teach
Us About the Patent System, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. Rev. 395 (2011) (describing the influence of
amicus briefs on patent courts).
106. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, What Do judges and justices Maximize?: (The Same Thing
Everyone Else Does), 3 SUP. Ct . ECON. Rev. 1, 13-14 (1993) (suggesting that judges derive
utility from their popularity with members of the bar).
107. An aggrieved patent owner who believes that her patent has been taken might be able
to file a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1491 seeking compensation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1)
(2017); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984); Bradley M. Taub,
Comment, Why Bother Calling Patents Property?: The Government’s Path to License Any
Patent and Maybe Pay for It, 6 J. MARSHALL R e v . I n t e l l . PROP. L. 151, 157-58 (2006)
(discussing the limited application of § 1491 to patents).
108. SeeJonathan S. Masur, CBA at the PTO, 65 DUKE L.J. 1701,1725-26 (2016) (offering backof-the-envelope estimates of the values of various patents). This would be only a fiscal
footnote continued on next page
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difficult and costly—the market value of a patent is usually far from clear, and
it is typically much harder to discern than the market value of real property.109
In other contexts, forcing the government to pay for its actions might be
beneficial. Here, however, the administrative expense involved, as well as the
fact that it would be courts that create the need for payment, would likely rob
the arrangement of any value. Recall that the general rationale for requiring
that takings be compensated is to force the government to internalize the costs
of its actions.110 If it is the court that is taking an action, but the legislature that
must then raise the necessary revenue to pay for it, this effort at cost
internalization will fail. More likely, courts would become reluctant to enact
legal change for fear of being blamed when they stick the federal government
with an enormous bill.
In addition, takings law is a poor fit because it offers only an asymmetric
solution to a symmetric problem. Recall that the problem of uncertainty in
patent law affects both owners and nonowners of patents.**111 Just as some firms
rely on the continued existence of patents to justify and fund their R&D
operations, other firms rely on the continued nonexistence of certain types of
patents to offer them freedom to operate without fear of being sued.112 The
problems caused by legal instability apply symmetrically, affecting legal
changes that increase or decrease the power of patents. Legal change that
strengthens patents or expands their reach can harm these existing reliance
interests just as much as legal change that weakens or invalidates patents can

cost, rather than a net social cost. Invalidating scores of patents would provide an
immediate benefit to consumer welfare by eliminating the “shadow tax” those patents
impose on consumer products. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 25, at 312. The overall
social benefits might outweigh the costs. Nevertheless, in practical terms, the federal
government would be reluctant to pay its share of the costs out of the federal fisc each
time valuable patents were invalidated, and the courts would likely be reluctant to run
up the federal tab in this fashion.
109. See Jonathan S. Masur, The Use and M isuse o f Patent Licenses, 110 Nw. U. L. Rev. 115,
122-25 (2015) (describing the difficulties courts face in valuing patents).
110. SeeSerkin, supra note 97, at 714-16.
111. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
112. See generally M. Henry Heines, The Two Faces o f Patent Due Diligence: A Case Study in Solar
Cells and Nanotechnology, 6 N anotechnology L. & Bus. 4 (2009) (describing the
importance of establishing freedom to operate by ascertaining that a new product will
not give rise to a patent infringement suit).
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harm reliance interests founded on those patents. For example, broadening the
scope of patent claims can frustrate past efforts at designing products to avoid
infringement.113
Takings law, by contrast, works asymmetrically. It is possible to imagine a
judicial decision invalidating a patent being treated as a judicial taking 114 and—
if the taking is not compensated—the decision being declared unconstitutional
and void.115 But it is essentially impossible to imagine a judicial decision
expanding patent rights being treated as a taking. As an analytic matter, the
absence of property rights—or freedom to operate—has never been classified as
“property,” and it is hard to imagine a court stretching the definition so far as
to accommodate it.116 And as a practical matter, it would be nearly impossible
to determine which parties were affected by the decision and therefore
deserved compensation. If takings law were applied to changes in patent law, it
would apply only to the loss of patent rights.
This would skew outcomes in the courts. Courts might be more willing to
make changes that invalidated existing patents if they knew the owners of
those patents would be compensated for the loss of their intellectual property
rights. Courts might also be more willing to make changes that expanded
intellectual property rights if it were costless to do so. But either way, the fact
that only one side would receive compensation would affect courts’
decisionmaking.117 For this reason, as well as the others described above, it
would be normatively undesirable if courts began to treat changes in
substantive patent law as takings for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.
So much for the normative case—what is the state of the law? Are judicial
changes that lead to patent invalidations potentially judicial takings? The next
two Subparts consider that question.

113. Firms expend resources in securing freedom to operate before making substantial
investment in development projects. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Noncompliance,
Nonenforcement, NonproblemRethinking the Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 45
HOUS. L. R e v . 1059, 1077 (2008) (citing John P. Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool
Patents and Licensing on Biomedical Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED
ECONOMY 285,292-94 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003)).
114. See infra text accompanying notes 135-38.
115. See supra text accompanying note 87.
116. That is to say, it has never been classified as property in a legal sense, or for purposes of
the takings clause. Various scholars have described the public domain as a type of
property available to everyone. See generally James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement
and the Construction of the Public Domain, L a w & CO NTEM P. PROBS., Winter-Spring 2003,
at 33 (using the language of property to describe the public domain as common
property available to all).
117. Cf. John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 G eo . W ash. L. R ev . 522, 542-43
(2007) (describing the effects of asymmetric incentives on judicial decisionmaking).
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B. Are Patents Property for Purposes of the Takings Clause?
The Supreme Court has held that because “[pjatents . . . have long been
considered a species of property . . . , they are surely included within the
‘property’ of which no person may be deprived by a State without due process
of law.”118
However, property rights entitled to protection under the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment are not necessarily entitled to protection under
the Takings Clause.119 This is particularly true of property rights that fall
within the category of federally created benefits.120 In Bowen v. Gilliard, the
Supreme Court held that a reduction in benefits from a government program
could be subjected to due process scrutiny but could not constitute a taking
under the Fifth Amendment.121 The analogy between the benefits at issue in
Bowen and patents is of course imperfect. But the holding in Bowen demon
strates generally that the description of patents as property in other contexts is
not dispositive to the question of patents’ status as property under the Takings
Clause.
Instead of the Takings Clause, much of the action regarding patents relates
to 28 U.S.C. § 1498. That statute provides:
W henever an invention described in and covered by a patent of the United States
is used or manufactured by or for the United States w ithout license of the owner
thereof or lawful right to use or manufacture the same, the owner’s remedy shall
be by action against the United States in the United States Court of Federal Claims
for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation for such use and
manufacture.122

Patentees thus generally do not bother with claims under the Takings Clause
when the government infringes a patent, because such claims can usually be
resolved under § 1498.123

118. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,642 (1999)
(quoting U.S. CONST, amend. V); see also Consol. Fruit-Jar Co. v. W right, 94 U.S. 92, 96
(1877) (“A patent for an invention is as much property as a patent for land. The right
rests on the same foundation, and is surrounded and protected by the same sanctions.”).
119. See U.S. CONST, amend. V (“[N]or shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, w ithout due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use, w ithout just compensation.”).
120. See Davida H. Isaacs, Not All Property Is Created Equal: Why Modern Courts Resist Applying
the Takings Clause to Patents, and Why They Are Right to Do So, 15 G eo . M ason L. R ev . 1,
36-41 (2007).
121. See 483 U.S. 587,602-06 (1987).
122. 28 U.S.C.§ 1498(a) (2017).
123. See Flannah Brennan et al., A Prescription for Excessive Drug Pricing: Leveraging
Government Patent Usefo r Health, 18 Yale J.L. & T ech . 275,308-13 (2016).
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Courts have described § 1498 as providing a cause of action to obtain
“compensation for the Government’s unauthorized taking and use” under the
doctrine of eminent domain.124 Both the Federal Circuit and Court of Claims
have occasionally gone further by referring explicitly to the Fifth Amendment
when discussing § 1498 claims.125
In Zoltek Corp. v. United States, however, the Federal Circuit rejected this
framing.126 There, the patentee alleged that a government contractor had
infringed on its carbon fiber methods patent when building fighter jets, and
that the federal government was therefore liable under § 1498.127 The trial
court had found that § 1498(c)—which bars any “claim arising in a foreign
country”—prevented Zoltek from making a claim under § 1498(a) because the
contractor manufactured the carbon fiber in Japan.128 However, the court
allowed Zoltek to amend its complaint to allege a Fifth Amendment taking.129
The Federal Circuit affirmed the trial court’s ruling with respect to the § 1498
claim but “reverse[d] the trial court’s ruling that Zoltek [could] allege patent
infringement as a Fifth Amendment taking.”130 The Supreme Court denied
certiorari,131 and though the Federal Circuit later reheard the case en banc and
reversed on other grounds,132 it left the relevant portion of its original Zoltek
opinion intact.
The contradiction between the Federal Circuit’s initial holding in Zoltek
and its previous descriptions of § 1498 is striking, but explainable. In previous
cases, statements about eminent domain or the Fifth Amendment had no effect

124. See, e.g., Motorola, Inc. v. United States, 729 F.2d 765, 768 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also
Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106, 1114 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (en banc) (per curiam)
(describing the statute in similar terms); Decca Ltd. v. United States, 544 F.2d 1070,1082
(Ct. Cl. 1976) (per curiam) (same).
125. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 86 F.3d 1566, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(“The government’s unlicensed use of a patented invention is properly viewed as a
taking of property under the Fifth Amendment through the government’s exercise
of its power of eminent domain and the patent holder’s remedy for such use is
prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a).”), vacated and remanded mem., 520 U.S. 1183 (1997);
Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 964 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (en banc) (“W hen the
government has infringed, it is deemed to have ‘taken’ the patent license under an
eminent domain theory, and compensation is the just compensation required by the
fifth amendment.”).
126. See 442 F.3d 1345, 1351-52 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (per curiam), vacated en banc, 672 F.3d 1309
(Fed. Cir. 2012).
127. See id. at 1349.
128. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(c) (2017); Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 688,689-90 (2003).
129. See Zoltek, 58 Fed. Cl. at 707.
130. See Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1353.
131. See Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 551 U.S. 1113 (2007) (mem.).
132. See Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 672 F.3d 1309,1314-22 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc).
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whatsoever on the success or failure of the claims: The § 1498 remedy would be
available regardless.133 Zoltek was important because the resolution of the
takings question was central to the holding.134 When it really mattered, the
Federal Circuit rejected the Takings Clause interpretation of § 1498, and both
the Federal Circuit sitting en banc and the Supreme Court chose not to reverse
that holding.
The Supreme Court recently suggested in dicta that patents might be
property for purposes of the Takings Clause. In Horne v. Department o f
Agriculture, the Court held that a U.S. Department of Agriculture order
requiring raisin producers to “physically set aside [raisins]... for the account of
the Government” without compensation constituted a taking under the Fifth
Amendment.135 As the Court noted, “[n]othing in the text or history of the
Takings Clause, or our precedents, suggests that the rule is any different when
it comes to the appropriation of personal property.”136 The Court supported
this principle with a quotation from James v. Campbell, a century-old case
addressing patent infringement: “[A patent] confers upon the patentee an
exclusive property in the patented invention which cannot be appropriated or
used by the government itself, without just compensation, any more than it
can appropriate or use without compensation land which has been patented to
a private purchaser.”137
Some scholars have argued that this choice of words “left no doubt... that
patents are subject to the Takings Clause.”138 Taken at face value, this assertion
seems reasonable: In an opinion holding that personal property is subject to the
Takings Clause, the Court cited a patent case as providing historical support
for that proposition. The implication is that the Court was agreeing with the
language from James. Applied in a relevant case, this would likely bring patents
under the protection of the Takings Clause.
Nonetheless, the quotation in Horne looks a lot like the past descriptions of
§ 1498 articulated by the Federal Circuit and Court of Claims: Patent
infringement is described in terms of eminent domain or takings when that
133. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 86 F.3d 1566, 1571-72 (Fed. Cir. 1996),
vacated and remanded mem., 520 U.S. 1183 (1997).
134. This is because compensation under § 1498 was unavailable due to the fact that the
infringing product had been manufactured in Japan. See Zoltek, 58 Fed. Cl. at 707; see also
28 U.S.C. § 1498(c) (2017) (“The provisions of this section shall not apply to any claim
arising in a foreign country.”).
135. See 135 S. Ct. 2419,2424-25,2431 (2015).
136. Id. at 2426.
137. Id. at 2427 (alteration in original) (quoting James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356,358 (1882)).
138. Gregory Dolin & Irina D. Manta, Taking Patents, 73 W ash . & L ee L. R e v . 719,775 (2016);
see also, e.g., Adam Mossoff, Supreme Court Recognizes That Patents Are Property, C t r . fo r
PROTECTION In t e l l . P r o p . (June 22,2015), https://perma.cc/FL3K-QF9G.
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characterization is irrelevant to the resolution of the case at hand.139 The
Supreme Court might choose to pursue this line of reasoning when it is
necessary for a holding, but it would be premature to assume that the Court
will do so.
Courts have also occasionally considered the status of patents in the
context of the regulatory takings doctrine. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
the Supreme Court held that government regulation of property can be so
restrictive as to be a taking requiring compensation under the Fifth
Amendment.140 In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, the Court
identified three key factors relevant to the question whether there has been a
regulatory taking: (l) “[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant”; (2) “the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations”; and (3) “the character of the governmental
action,” including an analysis of whether the taking was a “physical invasion by
the government.”141
In in its 1985 decision in Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, the Federal Circuit
applied the Penn Central regulatory takings test to the retroactive application of
a patent reexamination procedure used by the PTO.142 The patentee argued
that a federal statute retroactively subjecting his patent to reexamination
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.143 The Patlex court
eventually upheld the constitutionality of the statute.144 But in the course of
doing so, the court declared that patents “fall squarely within both classical and
judicial definitions of protectible property.”145 The court described its decision
in terms of due process, but the Penn Central test is an analysis of takings, and
thus this case is best understood as the application of takings law to a patent.
It is not clear, however, that Patlex s approach to the subject has stood the
test of time. This is the only case in which the Federal Circuit has applied the
Penn Central test in a patent case.146 No court has since regarded a patent as
property entitled to regulatory takings protection and applied the Penn Central
test. The handful of regulatory patent taking claims since Patlex have all failed,

139. See, e.g., Hughes A ircraft Co. v. U nited States, 86 F.3d 1566, 1571-72 (Fed. Cir. 1996),
vacated and remanded mem., 520 U.S. 1183 (1997).
140. See 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922).
141. 438U.S. 104,124(1978).
142. See 758 F.2d 594,597-99,602-03 (Fed. Cir.), modified, 771 F.2d 480 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
143. See id. at 598-99.
144. See id. at 603.
145. Id. at 599.
146. See id. at 602-03.
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some rather spectacularly.147 Two of these cases involved patentees whose
patents expired because they failed to pay maintenance fees. 148 That is, they
involved patentees who had no property interests whatsoever. A third was
very much like Patlex.149 From any perspective, then, the law is still far from
recognizing patents as property subject to the protection of the Takings
Clause.
C. Judicial Takings and Patent Law
Any analysis of whether changes in settled patent law might amount to
takings must confront a second complication: These would be judicial takings,
not the typical sort of takings created by executive or legislative action.150
In Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental
Protection, a plurality of the Supreme Court announced that courts could
themselves effect takings.151 That is, if a court declared that a previously
established property right no longer existed, that would constitute a taking for
purposes of the Fifth Amendment.152 The issue in Stop the Beach Renourishment
was a question of state law regarding beachfront land rights, 153 and the
decision did not clearly indicate whether its holding could also apply to
infringements of property rights under federal law. A portion of Justice Scalia’s
opinion joined only by a plurality of the Court stated that “the Takings Clause
bars the State from taking private property without paying for it, no matter
which branch is the instrument of the taking.”154 It is not clear whether his
reference to “the State” was to only the fifty state governments or to the
government generically (in all of its forms). Nevertheless, at a minimum, the

147. See, eg., Joy Techs., Inc. v. Manbeck, 959 F.2d 226, 228-29 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Korsinsky v.
Godici, No. 05 Civ. 2791(DLC), 2005 W L 2312886, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2005), affd
per curiam sub nom. Korsinsky v. Dudas, 227 F. App’x 891 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Michels v.
United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 426, 429-31 (2006); Figueroa v. United States, 57 Fed. Cl. 488
(2003), affd, 466 F.3d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
148. See Korsinsky, 2005 W L 2312886, at *5-6; Michels, 72 Fed. Cl. at 429-31.
149. See Joy Techs., 959 F.2d at 228-29 (holding that patent reexamination does not constitute
an unlawful taking or deprive the patent owner of his right to a jury trial).
150. For the leading article on judicial takings, see Barton FI. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings,
76 V a .L. R ev . 1449(1990).

151. See 560 U.S. 702,715 (2010) (plurality opinion).
152. See id.
153. See id. at 707-09 (majority opinion).
154. Id. at 715 (plurality opinion).
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opinion raises the implication that a federal decision altering patent rights
could similarly constitute a taking (if patents are property subject to takings
under the Fifth Amendment, of course).155
However, since Stop the Beach Renourishment, no court has held that a
judicial decision effected a taking.156 Courts have described most judicial
takings claims as flawed, either because they clearly failed the tests put forward
in Stop the Beach Renourishment or because they constituted improper collateral
attacks before courts lacking jurisdiction.157 For that matter, while some courts
have accepted the framework developed in the Stop the Beach Renourishment
plurality opinion,158 others have appeared skeptical that judicial takings are
indeed takings at all.159 Nonetheless, no court has held it impossible for a
federal court to effect a taking,160 and the Court of Federal Claims has
suggested it may have jurisdiction over a properly framed judicial takings
case.161
All of this is to say that a judicial takings claim based upon a change in the
law is highly speculative as a legal matter. This is probably for the good, given
the hurdles that applying takings law would impose on courts’ ability to

155. Cf. J. Nicholas Bunch, Note, Takings, Judicial Takings, and Patent Law, 83 T ex . L. R ev.

1747 (2005) (proposing a theory for how judicial takings doctrine might apply to patent
law).
156. See Shinnecock Indian Nation v. United States, 782 F.3d 1345, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(noting that the plaintiff “had been unable to cite to any ‘case in which a property
owner prevailed on a judicial takings claim’” (quoting Shinnecock Indian Nation v.
United States, 112 Fed. Cl. 369, 386 (2013), a ffd in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 782
F.3d 1345)).
157. See, e.g., Petro-Hunt, L.L.C. v. United States, 126 Fed. Cl. 367,380-81 (2016), a ffd , 862 F.3d
1370 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert, denied, 138 S. Ct. 1989 (2018); Shinnecock Indian Nation, 112 Fed.
Cl. at 383 n.6.
158. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 709 F.3d 1114, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Inv’rs Sav. Bank v.
Keybank Nat’l Ass’n, 38 A.3d 638,643-44 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012).
159. See, e.g., Shinnecock Indian Nation, 112 Fed. Cl. at 385.
160. There is also a separate question whether a change in federal law could constitute a

judicial taking. Some courts take the position that a judicial decision interpreting a
federal law merely indicates what that law has “always” meant. See, e.g., Rivers v.
Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 312-13, 313 n.12 (1994). Under this view, a patent
declared invalid under a new judicial decision was “always” invalid, and thus never
constituted property protected by the Takings Clause. It remains to be seen whether
this view of judicial action will prevail in judicial takings cases, in the event that the
doctrine of judicial takings evolves.
161. See Petro-Hunt, 126 Fed. Cl. at 382-83; cf. Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d
1339, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that the Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction
over takings claims that “do[] not require the trial court to review the district court’s
actions”).
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improve and update the law. But the possibility nonetheless exists, and it
would not be surprising to see takings claims, perhaps unsuccessful ones,
brought by aggrieved patent owners in the near future.162
*

*

*

The fact that judicial takings doctrine does not currently apply to patent
law is, then, a positive for the patent system, and one that courts should
maintain. By imposing high costs on legal change, takings law would
unnecessarily stultify the development of patent law. Takings law is also an
asymmetric response to a symmetric problem. It would protect patentholders
but not parties who relied on the freedom to operate in a technological field
where patents were not permitted. Nevertheless, the original problem that
motivated the inquiry into takings remains. Without any means of
compensating parties whose reliance interests are upset when the law is
changed, courts will sometimes harm investment-based expectations to such
an extent as to reduce R&D incentives going forward. In other cases, they may
refuse to alter the law even when it would be wise to do so. What is needed is
some means of slicing this Gordian knot—a mechanism that would free courts
to make necessary legal changes without fear of unduly harming existing
reliance interests. The next Part discusses a more promising candidate.
IV. Purely Prospective Changes to Patent Law
At its heart, the problem facing the patent system is generated by the fact
that legal change is both forward looking and backward looking. Change to
patent law affects future patents, which is beneficial—assuming that the legal
changes are improvements on the status quo. But change to patent law also
affects existing patents, which can be either beneficial—to the extent that it
eliminates harmful patents that impede innovation—or harmful—to the extent
that it affects reliance interests, destabilizes the law, and thereby diminishes
future investment incentives. Recall as well that the costs of legal change will
exist even if the legal change itself is a beneficial one.163 When judges fear that
their decisions might diminish future investment in R&D, they can become
understandably reluctant to amend the law.164 The consequences are
deleterious in either direction: either the courts change the law, to the
detriment of some existing reliance interests, or they refuse to change the law,
to the ongoing detriment of the patent system as a whole.
162. One such claim appears to be percolating, though it pertains to inter partes review
procedures, not changes in the law made by the federal courts. See Peter Leung,
Government Aims to Kill Fresh Attack on Patent Challenges, BLOOMBERG L., (Oct. 5, 2018,
3:05 PM), https://perma.cc/XVQ5-RQEQ.
163. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
164. See supra Part II.
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The solution is to decouple the effects on future patents from the effects on
existing patents—to allow courts to make positive changes affecting patents
that will be granted in the future without similarly affecting patents that
already exist. That is, federal courts should be given the power to make legal
decisions that are purely prospective. They should have the ability to issue
decisions that only affect patents that are granted after the decision, but do not
affect patents that existed when the case was decided.
The issue of when legal change should be made retroactive or purely
prospective is a general one in law.165 Yet even beyond its general importance,
the issue of retroactivity is particularly pressing for patent law because every
change in patent law potentially implicates existing patents (sometimes tens or
hundreds of thousands of patents) and thus affects substantial investmentbased interests as well. In addition, for reasons that this Part will examine,
patent law is a particularly fertile ground for the application of purely
prospective lawmaking.
At issue here is not merely the potential for nonretroactive patent deci
sions, but also the potential for nonretroactive judicial decisions more
generally. In theory, statutes and regulations can be made to apply purely
retroactively, purely prospectively, or both retroactively and prospectively.166
Policymakers in the executive and legislative branches are thus frequently
faced with the question whether they should “grandfather” existing activities
or individuals by exempting them from the new legal regime. Not surprisingly,
nonretroactive laws and regulations are ubiquitous.167 Yet courts issue purely
165. For general discussions of retroactivity across legal fields, see Fisch, supra note 47; and
Daniel E. Troy, Toward a Definition and Critique of Retroactivity, 51 Ala. L. Rev. 1329
(2000). For discussions of retroactivity in particular contexts, see Michael J. Graetz,
Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 47
(1977) (tax); Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of
Retroactive Legislation, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 692 (1960) (legislation); and Stephen R. Munzer,
A Theory of Retroactive Legislation, 61 T ex. L. Rev. 425 (1982) (same).
166. See Elmer E. Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of
Jurisprudence, 20 Minn. L. Rev. 775,778 (1936) (“[T]his principle in the English common
law meant that the courts. . . viewed themselves as bound by the rule of construction
that no law should be given an operation from a time prior to its enactment unless
Parliament had expressly provided that it should have such an effect or unless the
words of the Act could have no meaning except by application to this past time.”
(footnote omitted)); Troy, supra note 165, at 1349 (“Unless a statute expressly states an
intention to apply to pre-enactment transactions, court[s] traditionally apply the
‘presumption of prospectivity.’”).
167. See generally R ichard L. R evesz & J ack Lienke, Struggling for Air: Power Plants
and THE “W ar on Coal” 63-74 (2016) (discussing grandfathering in environmental
law); Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Grandfathering and Environmental
Regulation: The Law and Economics of New Source Review, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1677 (2007)
(detailing grandfathering within the administrative state); Steven Shavell, On Optimal
Legal Change, Past Behavior, and Grandfathering, 37 J. Legal Stud . 37 (2008) (discussing
the economic rationales for grandfathering).
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prospective legal rulings only rarely, despite indications from the Supreme
Court that they are permitted to do so.168 It is time for patent courts to avail
themselves of this opportunity. Nonretroactive lawmaking is already
pervasive in environmental law, land use and zoning, and a variety of other
areas of law that are governed primarily by statute and regulation.169 There is
no reason to deprive patent policymakers of the tool of prospective lawmaking
just because those policymakers happen to be judges, rather than legislators or
executive officials.
A. The Costs and Benefits of Nonretroactive Legal Change
The decision to alter a legal rule—whether by legislation, regulation, or
judicial decision—is necessarily accompanied by a decision as to whether the
new rule will affect existing actors and prior conduct, future actors and future
conduct, or both.170 Put another way, the issue that the legal decisionmaker
must typically face is whether to “grandfather” some preexisting conduct or
parties, exempting them from the new legal rule, or to subject everyone and
everything to the new legal regime.171 Few legal rules are deliberately made
retrospective only, though some turn out to be largely retrospective in
effect.172 In most cases, then, the choice is between purely prospective legal
rules and rules that are both prospective and retrospective.
To concretize the problem, imagine that a policymaker is about to
implement a new legal rule requiring all factories to install a newer, more
expensive type of pollution-reducing scrubber on their smokestacks.173 The
policymaker could be a legislature, an administrative agency, or a court—for
the moment, the point is general to all of these institutional actors. The new
rule will apply to every new factory constructed in the future. The question is
whether, and to what extent, it should also apply to factories that already exist,
168. See infra Part IV.D.
169. See Nash & Revesz, supra note 167, at 1696-705; Shavell, supra note 167, at 69-70.
170. See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. Rev. 509,
511-13(1986).
171. See Kyle D. Logue, Tax Transitions, Opportunistic Retroactivity, and the Benefits of
Government Precommitment, 94 MlCH.L.REV. 1129, 1138-43 (1996) (promoting transition
relief for some changes in the law); Jonathan Masur, Judicial Deference and the Credibility
of Agency Commitments, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 1021, 1025, 1041-47 (2007) (explaining that
grandfathering may be appropriate in order to induce actors to undertake voluntary,
socially desirable projects); Jonathan Remy Nash, Allocation and Uncertainty: Strategic
Responses to Environmental Grandfathering, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 809,830,842 (2009) (arguing
for grandfathering from the perspective of governmental legitimacy).
172. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 67, at 1550-53 (explaining that many patent decisions turn out
to have only retroactive effect).
173. See Shavell, supra note 167, at 44-50 (discussing and analyzing similar problems and
questions related to legal change).
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or, conversely, whether some existing factories should be grandfathered and
allowed to continue using a less expensive and less effective scrubber.
The first and most obvious advantage of making the new rule fully
retroactive is that it is likely superior to the old rule.174 (If not, it would be odd
to adopt it.) In this example, perhaps the new scrubbers eliminate more
pollution than the older models. Thus, the more factories that are forced to
switch to the new scrubbers, the greater the environmental benefits. Relatedly,
another reason to make the rule change fully retroactive is to encourage
regulated parties to anticipate the legal change.175 Suppose that one year before
the rule change, a firm is constructing a new factory. The new scrubbers exist,
but they are not yet mandatory. It would be socially optimal if the firm
installed the new scrubbers rather than the old, but the new scrubbers might be
more expensive. If policymakers generally do not grandfather existing
factories, the firm may anticipate that it will be forced to switch to the new
scrubbers at some point in the near future.176 It may therefore choose to install
them from the outset. But if the firm believed that its factory may be exempted
from the new rule, it might instead install the old scrubbers, thus producing
greater pollution and possibly having to bear the expense of installing the new
scrubbers a few years later. Lastly, refusing to grandfather existing uses will
reduce or eliminate lobbying and rent-seeking activity.177 If the policymaker is
willing to make exceptions to the new rule, existing factories will lobby to
obtain those potentially valuable exceptions. This activity is socially wasteful.
But if there is no possibility that a firm will obtain an exception, there is no
reason to lobby.
On the other hand, though, there are often compelling reasons militating
in favor of making a legal rule prospective only, or at least in favor of
grandfathering certain existing activities. First, if every new legal rule is
applied both prospectively and retroactively, regulated private parties will not
be able to rely on the continued existence of any particular legal rule. They will
be reluctant to make new investments that might be derailed or rendered
worthless by a change in the law. Here, for instance, firms might even resist

174. See Kaplow, supra note 170, at 551-52 (describing the virtues of legal transitions and
reasons for expediting them).
175. See Saul Levmore, Changes, Anticipations, and Reparations, 99 COLUM. L. Rev. 1657,1658-59
(1999) (suggesting that legal change should be designed to encourage anticipation).
176. See id. at 1673 (describing the public choice dynamics of legal change and firms’
behavior).
177. Cf. id. at 1658-59 (analyzing the effects of decisions not to grandfather existing uses on
political and interest group behavior).
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constructing factories with new scrubbers, fearful that they might soon be
required to install newer and more expensive scrubbers. This is the rationale
that applies to patent law with greatest force, for the reasons detailed in Part I
above.
Second, the new rule may be superior with respect to new activities but
not existing ones.178 Imagine that the old scrubbers cost SI,000 to install and
eliminate $2,000 worth of pollution, and that the new scrubbers cost SI,500 to
install and eliminate $3,000 worth of pollution. It would be socially optimal for
a new factory to install a new scrubber, which would generate a net benefit of
$1,500 ($3,000 - $1,500). But consider a factory that already has an old scrubber
installed. The marginal increase in benefits from switching to a new scrubber is
just $1,000 ($3,000 - $2,000), but the new scrubber would cost $1,500. Forcing
firms to retrofit and install the new scrubbers is thus inefficient. This may be
true for patent law as well. For instance, a judicial decision that curtailed
patenting in some technological field might lead to greater future innovation
in that field. But it also might harm innovation by existing firms, which would
cease ongoing R&D if their patents, current and future, instantly became
unenforceable.179 The optimal balance might be to free firms from the
constraints imposed by patents in the future while allowing existing patents to
remain in force.
Third, insisting that a new legal rule be both prospective and retroactive
may make it more difficult to enact legal change in the first instance. In this
example, the scrubbers are bad for the firms that must install and pay for them
but good for society as a whole, which benefits from the reduction in pollution.
If the policymaker will not grandfather existing uses, the new legal rule will be
opposed by every firm that owns or contemplates constructing an affected
factory. The policymaker will be forced to overcome this united resistance to
enact the new rule.180 However, if the policymaker grandfathers some (or all)
existing factories, then the owners of those factories will potentially join in
supporting the new legal rule. Thus, the policymaker can use the possibility of
nonretroactive lawmaking to pursue a “divide and conquer” strategy that
makes enactment of the rule more likely in the first instance.181 This is the flip
178. See Shavell, supra note 167, at 47-50 (analyzing the economics of legal rules as applied to
new and existing uses); see also Masur & Nash, supra note 45, at 396-405 (discussing the
possibility of transition relief to address inefficiencies that arise when new rules are
applied to existing activity).
179. See Sichelman, supra note 35, at 354-56 (analyzing firms' incentives to turn existing
R&D into marketable consumer products).
180. See Levmore, supra note 175, at 1665 (“After all, if new losers simply go uncompensated
for the burdens new law imposes on them, then they can be expected to work to delay
the implementation of proposed changes.”).
181. See generally Eric A. Posner et al., Divide and Conquer, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 417 (2010).
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side of the point about avoiding lobbying and rent seeking, described above.
Rent seeking is usually wasteful, but in some cases, it may be necessary to
facilitate legal change.
The possibility of rent seeking and the prospect that grandfathering might
facilitate legal change do not apply with the same force to judicially created
legal rules, which are the focus of this Article, as they do to legislative or
agency lawmaking. But they are not entirely irrelevant either. There is
evidence that courts are influenced by amici, particularly amici who credibly
argue that a change in a legal rule will do violence to their businesses.182 It is
not far-fetched to imagine that news stories or public discourse can similarly
affect judicial decisionmaking. If this is the case, judicial decisionmaking may
turn out to reflect interest group politics, at least to some degree.
Regardless, the other arguments for and against nonretroactive lawmaking
and grandfathering apply just as strongly to judicial decisions as they do to
legislation and regulation. The real question is not the institutional actor but the
type of legal question. As the foregoing Parts demonstrated, judicial decisions
frequently implicate reliance interests and ongoing investment in existing assets.
Of course, this is not to say that legal rules should never be made retroactive—to
the contrary, most rules likely should be fully retroactive and fully prospective,
particularly if the quality of legal rules improves over time. Rather, the point is
that there will be some legal rules that should be implemented only prospective
ly, and some reliance interests that should be protected with grandfathering.
Legal policymakers, including courts, should have discretion to make rules
nonretroactive when it seems appropriate to do so. Accordingly, it is not
surprising that many laws and regulations include some element of pure
prospectivity183—that is to say, some element of grandfathering—though others
are fully retroactive .184
B.

Nonretroactive Changes in Patent Law

These arguments for nonretroactivity apply, mutatis mutandis, to patent
law as well. W hen judges decide patent cases, they should have the option of
offering rulings that are purely prospective. That is, they should have the
authority to grandfather preexisting patents, locking them into the prior legal
regime that existed before the case at hand was decided. Nonretroactive judicial
decisions allow for prospective changes in the law without potentially
upsetting reliance interests or diminishing incentives to invest in R&D.
182. See Chien, supra note 105, at 400-02.
183. See Shavell, supra note 167, at 74 & n.52 (describing some examples of such legal rules).
184. See Levmore, supra note 175, at 1671,1679,1690-93 (identifying examples of retroactive
lawmaking and proxies thereof, ranging from tobacco company liability to criminal
law to reparations for past injustices); see also Troy, supra note 165, at 1334-37.
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Nonretroactivity allows judges to change the law without generating the
negative consequences that animate takings law and the principle of stare
decisis.
Nonretroactive judicial decisions involve the same advantages and
disadvantages that typically accompany nonretroactivity. The knowledge that
courts can protect existing patent rights will increase incentives for firms to
continue investing in R&D despite the uncertainty surrounding potential legal
changes.185 A nonretroactive decision, by not impinging on existing patent
rights, does not upset existing reliance interests and thus does not threaten to
diminish investment incentives.186 On the other hand, the old rule may be
inferior to the new rule, and the possibility of being grandfathered may
discourage patent owners from adapting to the new regime ahead of time.187
Lastly, while the possibility of grandfathering may induce firms to spend
resources on “lobbying” the courts for exemptions—through amicus briefs and
the like—it will also allow judges to amend the law prospectively despite
opposition in circumstances when the courts would otherwise have stayed
their hand.
Consider, for example, the rules governing the patentability of business
methods.188 In 1998, at the very beginning of the internet era, the Federal
Circuit held that business methods could be patented.189 Within just a few
years, however, it became clear that the Federal Circuit’s decision was
misguided.190 As the internet economy exploded, firms began to exploit the
Federal Circuit’s ruling to obtain patents that covered standard business
practices.191 Patent trolls began to purchase these types of patents in large

185. See Daniel R. Cahoy, C hanging the Rules in the M iddle o f the Game: How the Prospective
Application o f Judicial Decisions Related to Intellectual Property Can Promote Economic
Efficiency, 41 Am. Bus. L.J. 1, 37 (2003) (“In view of the economic effects of judicial
retroactivity on intellectual property interests, it seems that a compelling case can be
presented for [nonretroactivity].”); supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
186. See Shavell, supra note 167, at 68-69.
187. See supra te x t accompanying notes 174-77.
188. The PTO has defined a business method patent as "a patent that claims a method or
corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or other operations used in
the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service, except
that the term does not include patents for technological inventions.” 37 C.F.R.
§ 42.301(a) (2018).
189. See State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
1998), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008), a ffd sub nom. Bilski v.
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
190. See Michael J. Meurer, Business M ethod Patents and Patent Floods, 8 W ash. U. J.L. & Pol ’y
309, 310-14 (2002) (describing the problems caused by the Federal Circuit’s decision in
State Street and arguing that it should be reversed).
191. See id. at 319-20.
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numbers and use them to extract rents from productive firms.192 Nonetheless,
the Federal Circuit never revisited its ruling—possibly for fear of upsetting
reliance interests—and the Supreme Court did not get around to addressing the
issue until sixteen years had passed.193 If the Federal Circuit had realized its
ability to change the law prospectively but not retroactively, and thus protect
existing interests, a solution to the problem of business method patents might
have come much sooner.
Yet it is not the case that patent decisions should never be retroactive, nor is
it the case that they should always be retroactive. A corner solution is not called
for. In deciding whether to make their decisions retroactive, judges should
consider a range of factors. First, and most obviously, they should consider
how far superior the new rule is to the old one. The greater the distance in
quality between new rule and old, the stronger the case for retroactivity.
Second, they should consider the extent to which the putative change in
patent law will discourage future investment. This inquiry can be decomposed
into several component parts. One is the degree to which the new rule
represents a substantial and unexpected change in the law, as opposed to an
incremental or predictable change in light of prior decisions. The more
unexpected a legal change, the more that making the change retroactive will
upset existing reliance interests and affect ongoing R&D decisions.194
Relatedly, courts should consider the degree to which firms’ reliance
interests will be harmed if a change in the law invalidates existing patents or
makes it more difficult to obtain future patents. The more that a given decision
harms existing reliance interests, the more that firms are likely to fear
decisions that might harm future interests.195 One indicator of potential
damage to reliance interests is whether private firms have made field- or
technology-specific investments. The more they have done so, and the more
difficult it is to reorient those investments in directions that have not been

192. See John M. Golden, Commentary, 'Patent Trolls" and Patent Remedies, 85 T ex . L. R ev .
2111, 2112-13 (2007) (describing the business model of patent trolls); David Orozco,
A dm inistrative Patent Levers, 117 PENN St . L. R ev . 1, 10 (2012) (noting that patent trolls
“aggressively wield business method patents”).
193. The Supreme Court held nearly all business methods to be unpatentable in Alice Corp. v.
CLS B ank International. See 134 S. Ct, 2347, 2360 (2014). The Court had taken a more
tentative step in the same direction four years earlier in Bilski v. Kappos. See 561 U.S. at
612-13.
194. See Cahoy, supra note 185, at 18 & nn.65-66; Fisch, supra note 47, at 1092-93.
195. See Cass R. Sunstein, Essay, W h a t’s Available?: Social Influences and Behavioral Economics,
97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1295, 1297 (2003) (“Under the availability heuristic, people assess
probabilities by asking whether examples readily come to mind.”).
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affected by the legal change, the greater the damage to their reliance interests. If
firms have invested heavily in producing an innovation backed by a particular
type of patent, that militates against retroactively holding those types of
patents invalid.
At the same time, the preceding analysis suggests that courts should
approach retroactivity in an asymmetric fashion. While there is often a strong
argument in favor of issuing a retroactive decision that invalidates or weakens
patents, decisions that expand or strengthen patent rights should very rarely
be made retroactive. First, it is very unlikely that a firm would make an
investment in reliance on a court changing the law in that firm’s favor in the
future, particularly given the relatively short time it can take to obtain a patent
versus the longer time it can take to bring a product to market.196 Betting on a
change in the law of patentability, for example, makes less sense if the change
will take place only after the firm has obtained its patents under the old legal
regime.
Second, if firms are relying on anything, they are relying on existing law,
not some hypothetical, future improved state of the law. Retroactively
granting firms more powerful patents than they were expecting is unlikely to
generate any additional R&D. After all, the firm was willing to make the
original investment in innovating without any guarantee of patent protection.
Rather, a retroactive change that strengthens patent rights would more likely
constitute an unnecessary windfall to existing patentholders. And retroactively
granting firms broader or more powerful patents can frustrate the reliance
interests of innovators who have expended firm resources on designing around
claimed inventions under the belief that their activity was noninfringing.197
Making these determinations may seem like quite a lot to ask of judges—
especially patent judges, who often make a great show of the fact that they are
merely interpreting the law and not enacting economic policy.198 Nonetheless,
196. This is particularly the case in the pharmaceutical industry, and Congress’s observation
of this difficulty resulted in the Hatch-Waxman Act, which granted patent term
extensions to innovator pharmaceutical companies. See Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, sec. 201(a), § 156,98 Stat. 1585,
1598-602 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2017)); Warner-Lambert Co. v.
Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Since the [Food and Drug Admin
istration] generally took much longer to approve a[] [new drug application] than the
United States Patent and Trademark Office took to grant a patent, a manufacturer’s
patent term was substantially eroded by the time the patentee was able to derive any
profit from the invention. . . . The Hatch-Waxman Act intended to . . . restore to
innovators patent time lost during testing and regulatory approval__ ”).
197. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text; supra notes 111-13 and accompanying
text.
198. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980) (“Whatever their validity, the
contentions now pressed on us should be addressed to the political branches of the
Government, the Congress and the Executive, and not to the courts.”).
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it is clear that patent judges are already considering such factors when they
make decisions. Indeed, such considerations are part of the everyday process of
judging: Every time the Federal Circuit considers whether to overrule a
precedent or to adhere to stare decisis, it is weighing reliance interests—the
principle underlying stare decisis—against the benefits of switching to a new
rule.
In fact, it is clear that Federal Circuit judges are consciously evaluating the
effects of their decisions on reliance interests and investment—they are explicit
in saying so.199 There have been multiple decisions in which Federal Circuit
judges have explained that existing interests compel an outcome contrary to
the one they might have reached had they been writing on a blank slate.200
None of this is to say that judges are necessarily adept at undertaking these
types of inquiries; they may lack the necessary institutional capacity for any
number of reasons.201 But they are already engaged in this enterprise, and
indeed, because of stare decisis principles, doing so is part of the normal process
of judging. So long as courts are going to weigh these factors, it makes sense for
them to do it systematically and with purpose. It also makes sense for this
aspect of judicial decisionmaking to be explicit in courts’ opinions, so that it
can be reviewed and evaluated on appeal.
In addition, the need for judges to have the option of rendering nonretro
active decisions is a function of the mechanisms by which substantive patent
law is made. Many other areas of federal law—environmental law, securities
law, and so forth—are governed substantially by statute and regulation.202
Purely prospective lawmaking is a well-worn tool in the statutory and
regulatory toolboxes, and one that Congress and administrative agencies use
frequently.203 Patent law is one of the few areas of federal law where most of

199. See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d
1303, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Moore, ]., concurring in part), a ffd in part, rev’d in part sub
nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013).
200. See supra text accompanying notes 81-82.
201. See Masur, Regulating Patents, supra note 17, at 278-79 (arguing that administrative
agencies are better equipped than judges to regulate patent law).
202. See id. (contrasting patent law with these other areas of law).
203. See generally, e.g., Nash & Revesz, supra note 167 (discussing the widespread
grandfathering in Clean Air Act regulations).
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the substantive action takes place in the courts.204 Patent law will be artificially
hamstrung if the judges who craft it are not permitted to use the tool of purely
prospective lawmaking.205
In fact, when Congress amends the same rules of patent law that are
frequently the subject matter of judicial decisions, it will sometimes elect to
make the new rule prospective only, in a fashion heretofore considered
unavailable to courts. For instance, the 2011 America Invents Act dramatically
changed the rules governing priority in patent practice, moving to a “first to
file” system.206 But those changes were purely prospective: They applied only
to patents filed eighteen months after the enactment of the law.207 Meanwhile,
the courts regularly alter the rules governing novelty and patentability
without discussing the possibility that the new rules should be prospective
only.208 Similarly, in 2013, the Australian legislature passed a law altering the
rules governing obviousness, but it provided that the change would apply
purely prospectively.209 By contrast, when the U.S. Supreme Court made a
similar change in 2007, that decision was understood to be fully retroactive,
and the Court offered no discussion of the question.210
At the same time, it is important to note that even if a court decides to
render a judgment nonretroactive, this will not necessarily protect all of the
reliance interests involved. For instance, a Firm might invest billions of dollars
in R&D for a single type of invention, believing that it will be able to obtain
204. See Masur, Regulating Patents, supra note 17, at 304 (noting that the courts are “firmly
ensconced as the expositors of patent law”); see also id. at 304-25 (arguing that the status
quo should be altered to provide regulatory agencies with more authority over patent
law).
205. To be sure, judges may not be as adept at utilizing this tool as are legislatures
and agencies. See Masur, Regulating Patents, supra note 17, at 278-82; supra text
accompanying notes 166-67. But that is not a reason to deny it to them entirely and to
thereby restrict the development of patent law.
206. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 3(b)(1), § 102, 125 Stat.
284,285-87 (2011) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2017)).
207. See id. § 3(n)(l), 125 Stat. at 293.
208. See, e.g., Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 64-68 (1998) (redefining what it means for
an invention to be “on sale”); Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373,
1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (deciding, as a matter of first impression, that the prior art need
not disclose a chemical in order for that chemical to be inherently present in the prior
art).
209. See Intellectual Property Laws A m endm ent (Raising the Bar) A ct 2012 (Cth) s 2 (Austl.);
id. s 3 sch 1 pts 1, 3; see also Mark Summerfield, A ustralia’s Four Laws o f Inventive Step,
PATENTOLOGY (May 6, 2013,1:25 AM), https://perma.cc/3DRR-UPS8.
210. See KSR Int’I Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 407, 415-16 (2007) (rejecting the lower
court’s “rigid” application of the “teaching, suggestion, and motivation test”); see also,
e.g., In re Gleizer, 356 F. App’x 415, 421 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that the KSR decision is
to be given “full retroactive effect” (quoting Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S.
86,97(1993))).
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patents related to this invention for decades to come. A continuing stream of
patent-based income may be necessary to justify the R&D costs and permit the
firm to recoup its investment.211 Grandfathering existing patents will be only a
partial solution. Equivalently, a firm might have invested billions of dollars in
R&D, believing that patents in the field are unavailable and that it therefore
does not risk being excluded by its competitors.212 If the rules change, allowing
such patents only prospectively may not be enough to protect the firm’s
investment. But in either case, nonretroactivity will be at least a partial
solution, and one preferable to a fully retroactive judicial decision.
There are also important connections between takings law and retroactivity.
By protecting existing rights, purely prospective lawmaking acts as a substitute
for takings law. It accomplishes the same end—insuring valuable investment
against legal change213—without the financial costs and negative incentive
effects that accompany takings.214 In addition, while patents are not currently
viewed as property that can be judicially taken, that may not always be the
case.215 This would be normatively undesirable for all of the reasons described
above.216 But if the law were to evolve in this direction, nonretroactive judicial
decisions could provide an antidote. A new legal rule that does not apply
retroactively to a certain set of existing property rights does not constitute a
taking of those rights. Judges could thus remain free to update the law, purely
prospectively, without having to worry that their decisions will run afoul of the
Takings Clause or impose large costs on the federal fisc.
Finally, although patents are functionally similar to other property rights
in most respects, they are distinct in one critical regard: Patents expire, and
they do so in a relatively short period of time.217 Expiration changes the
calculus of the costs and benefits of retroactivity, and makes patent law
especially conducive to grandfathering.
Suppose that a policymaker exempts a factory from installing a new type
of scrubber,218 allowing that factory to continue polluting at the rate allowed
under the old legal rule. This involves some amount of social harm:
211. SeeSichelman, supra note 35, at 360-61 (describing firms’ business plans and the ways in
which patents are incorporated).
212. See generally Kal Raustiala & CHRISTOPHER Sprigman, T he Knockoff ECONOMY:
How Imitation Sparks Innovation (2012) (describing many fields in which firms rely
upon the ability to operate free of intellectual property restrictions).
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

See supra P a rt IV.A.
See supra P a rt III.A.
See supra Parts III.B-.C.
See supra P a rt III.A.
See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2017) (setting the patent term at twenty years from the date of
filing).
See supra P a rt IV.A.
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The factory is producing more pollution than is socially optimal given the
availability of existing technology. The continued operation of this factory
with the old scrubber is a necessary evil, tolerated either because the
alternative would be even more wasteful or because policymakers wish to
encourage ongoing investment in the factory’s underlying production.219
The same is true for patents. Suppose a court decides that a particular type
of invention should not constitute patentable subject matter going
forward220—perhaps because patents on this type of invention tend to hinder
innovation more than they further i t 221 It would be tempting for the court to
invalidate all of the existing patents of this type. After all, the invention has
already occurred, and now the patents are doing more harm than good.222 But
in some cases it may be necessary to preserve the existing patents. Invalidating
them might destroy incentives to commercialize the underlying inventions, or
harm investment incentives more generally.223 These are the factors a court
must weigh: the ongoing harm from grandfathering a suboptimal patent, on
the one hand, and the benefits of encouraging further investment, on the other.
The court knows, however, that the harm from grandfathering existing
patents will not last forever. Unlike a factory, which might continue to spew
excessive levels of pollution for decades, the suboptimal patents will expire
twenty years from the date of filing, which in most cases is roughly eighteen
years from when they are granted.224 This means that even if a court
mistakenly grandfathers some patents whose existence is suboptimal, the harm
is limited. Those patents will disappear; they will not impose harm
indefinitely.
Indeed, patents are unusual among legal instruments in this respect. Real
and chattel property can exist in perpetuity,225 and thus socially suboptimal
219. SeeShavell, supra note 167, at 51-53.
220. C f, e.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Inti, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355-60 (2014) (invalidating
patents that do not contain an “inventive concept” separate from any abstract idea
(quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66,72 (2012))).
221. See id. at 2354 (‘“[Mjonopolization of [abstract ideas] through the grant of a patent might
tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it,’ thereby thwarting
the primary object of the patent laws.” (first alteration in original) (quoting M ayo, 566
U.S. at 71)).
222. Indeed, any given patent could be invalidated on these grounds.
223. See Sichelman, supra note 35, at 360-61 (describing the incentives necessary to promote
not just development but also commercialization of inventions).
224. A patent is valid for twenty years from the date of filing, see 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2017),
and the PTO takes twenty-one months on average to examine a patent once it has been
granted. See Masur, supra note 108, at 1732 n.149. Subtracting twenty-one months from
the twenty-year life span of the patent yields eighteen years and three months.
225. See A. Samuel Oddi, TRIPS—N atural R ights and a “Polite Form o f Economic Imperialism," 29
Vand.J.T ransnat’l L. 415, 430 (1996) (“Tangible property does not expire, although it
may be expended.”).
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uses of that property might endure for decades or even centuries. Copyrights
have finite terms, but those terms are much longer than patent terms and are
regularly extended.226 Patents, on the other hand, are one of the few legal
instruments that contain an inherent check on the amount of social harm that
can accrue if they are exempted from changes in the law. For this reason,
patent law is an especially good context for nonretroactive lawmaking.
C. The Mechanics of Retroactive and Prospective Lawmaking
We come finally to the question of how, in practical terms, purely pro
spective judicial decisionmaking would work. Suppose that a patent defendant
argues that the patent asserted against it in a given case is invalid. Once the
court has decided whether or not the patent is invalid, how should it go about
determining whether that decision applies retroactively or only prospectively,
or even to the case at bar?
1.

From habeas to patent law

In implementing purely prospective patent law, courts need not worry
about reinventing the wheel. There is a model that patent courts could borrow,
found in the law of federal habeas corpus. Under the doctrine announced by a
plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane227 and subsequently
codified by AEDPA,228 a “new rule” of constitutional criminal procedure229
does not apply to criminal convictions that have already been finalized on
direct review unless it falls within a recognized exception.230 This means that
226. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,193-94 (2003) (observing that most copyrights “run
from creation until 70 years after the author’s death” and listing previous copyright
term extensions approved by Congress); see also 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2017).
227. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
228. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2017) (providing that habeas relief is only available when a
state court decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”
(emphasis added)); see also Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-132, § 104,110 Stat. 1214,1218-19 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2254).
229. By this we mean the doctrines related to the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz,
The Uneasy Relationship Between C rim inal Procedure and C rim inal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1,
28,43 (1997) (explaining this categorization).
230. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 379-80 (2000) (opinion of Stevens, J.) (explaining
that AEDPA codified Teague’s general bar on retroactivity).
To be clear, we are not necessarily endorsing any aspect of the law of habeas as applied
to criminal convictions, or arguing that Teague was rightly decided. We offer habeas as
a model for how courts might treat patent cases, and as a demonstration that the courts
are already capable of making the types of decisions that such an approach would
require.
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if a prisoner challenges his conviction with a habeas corpus petition, he cannot
take advantage of any new rule handed down since his conviction became final
(that is, when he exhausted his direct appeals). The upshot is that courts’
criminal procedure decisions are quasi-prospective—they apply to anyone
whose case is still pending on direct review, but not to anyone whose
conviction is already final but who is still pursuing postconviction relief.
The mechanics of postconviction review, at a high level, are straightfor
ward. The Supreme Court, hearing a criminal case on direct review, issues a
decision on an issue of constitutional criminal procedure. A subsequent court,
reviewing a similar issue in the context of a habeas petition, will then decide
whether the Supreme Court’s ruling applies retroactively to cases on habeas
review.231 If the subsequent court decides that the Supreme Court has enacted a
“new rule,” that new rule will not apply to convictions that are challenged
through habeas (again, unless it falls within a recognized exception).232 Habeas
cases are adjudicated by the federal district courts and then subsequently by the
twelve regional circuits.233 Accordingly, the same district courts that handle
patent cases, as well as every court of appeals save the Federal Circuit, have been
implementing this type of procedure in the thirty years since Teague was
decided.

231. See, e.g., Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 658-69 (2001) (“Under Cage v. Louisiana, a jury
instruction is unconstitutional if there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury
understood the instruction to allow conviction w ithout proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. In this case, we must decide whether this rule was ‘made retroactive to cases on
collateral review by the Supreme Court.’” (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A) (1999)) (citing Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990) (per curiam),
abrogated by Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991))).
232. For instance, the Supreme Court in Ring v. Arizona held that the Sixth Amendment
requires that all aggravating facts making a defendant eligible for the death penalty be
found by a jury. See 536 U.S. 584, 597, 609 (2002). The Court then later held that the
holding of Ring was a new rule and thus did not apply retroactively on habeas review.
See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 358 (2004); see also, e.g., Tyler, 533 U.S. at 658-59
(holding that the constitutional ruling about jury instructions on reasonable doubt
announced in Cage v. Louisiana did not apply retroactively); Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S.
383, 388,396-97 (1994) (same for the double jeopardy ruling in Bullington v. Missouri, 451
U.S. 430 (1981)); Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 229 (1990) (same for the capital
sentencing ruling in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985)).
The two recognized exceptions to the Teague bar are “new substantive rules of
constitutional law,” such as “‘rules forbidding criminal punishment of certain primary
conduct,’ as well as ‘rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of
defendants because of their status or offense,’” M ontgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718,
728 (2016) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989), abrogated in other part by
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)), and “new '“watershed rules of criminal
procedure” implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal
proceeding,”’ id. (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348,352 (2004)).
233. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a), 2253(a) (2017).

1009

Patents, Property, and Prospectivity
71 Stan . L. Rev . 963 (2019)

Patent courts should adopt a similar procedure. A court that decides a
patent case should first determine whether it has in fact changed the law—
whether it has created a “new rule” or merely applied an existing one. This will
of course be easier in some cases and more difficult in others. But it is not an
unfamiliar task for judges. Even patent courts must frequently decide whether
a case created a new rule of law in order to adjudicate collateral questions such
as whether issue preclusion applies,234 whether a party may amend its
pleadings,235 or whether to award attorneys’fees.236
If the rule is not new, it will apply in every case; if the rule is new, the
court must decide whether it should be applied retroactively or purely
prospectively, following the considerations related to reliance interests and
social costs outlined above.
As a practical matter, this means that courts will likely be biased toward
holding that their rules are not new. Doing so will simplify their decisionmaking
and reduce their workload .237 In addition, judges tend to insist that they are not
making new rules, most likely for reasons of institutional perception:
Legislatures, not courts, are supposed to make new law .238 Accordingly, the
likely default option will be to treat a judicial decision as merely applying an
existing rule, and the majority of cases will probably be categorized accordingly.

234. See, e.g., Voter Verified, Inc. v. Election Sys. & Software LLC, 887 F.3d 1376, 1381-82
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that the “change of law” exception to the application of issue
preclusion did not apply), cert, denied, No. 18-549, 2019 WL 113159 (U.S. Jan. 7, 2019).
235. See, e.g., Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314,1321-22 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (holding that Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International was a sufficient change in
the law to provide “good cause” under the local rules for the patent infringement
defendant to amend its invalidity contentions); see also Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Inti,
134S.Ct. 2347(2014).
236. See, e.g., Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372,1377-80 (Fed.
Cir. 2017) (affirming an award of attorneys’ fees where the defendant argued that the
plaintiff should have given up prosecution of the case after Alice was decided because
the legal landscape had changed). That is not to say that courts will not sometimes try
to duck the question whether a particular decision created a new rule. In Encyclopaedia
Britannica, Inc. v. Dickstein Shapiro LLP, for instance, the district court held that the
patentholder’s malpractice case could not succeed because even if the defendant law
firm had rendered deficient performance, the subsequent Alice decision would have
invalidated the patent anyway. See 128 F. Supp. 3d 103, 110-12, 116 (D.D.C. 2015), a ffd
per curiam, 653 F. App’x 764 (D.C. Cir. 2016). To justify this holding, the court decided
that Alice did not change the law—contrary to the Federal Circuit's view in First Choice
Loan and Inventor Holdings. See Encyclopaedia Britannica, 128 F. Supp. 3d at 110-11; see also
David Hricik, Update: I f Alice W as A lw ays the Law, W h y Did You Get So M any “Invalid”
Patents fo r Your Clients?, Patently-0 (Sept. 26,2016), https://perma.cc/YV7X-K7BG.
237. Cf. Bronsteen, supra note 117, at 535-36 (analyzing the effects of judicial asymmetries in
the context of summary judgment).
238. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980) (insisting that legal policymaking
is a matter for Congress); see also infra Part IV.D.
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If a court decides that it has created a new legal rule, the last remaining
question is whether the rule should be fully retroactive and prospective, or
merely prospective.239 The court that creates the new rule could decide this
question as well, but it is not necessary for it to do so. It could leave the issue
open and allow a subsequent litigant—who wishes the rule to be applied
retroactively—to raise it before a future court.
There are advantages and disadvantages to both approaches. The court that
first issues the new legal ruling may understand the rule best and have already
done the hard work of thinking through the costs and benefits of its approach.
It may be best situated to decide whether the rule should be applied
retroactively. On the other hand, a subsequent court would have the advantage
of having observed reactions to the new legal rule and assessed its operation,
which might provide valuable information regarding whether the rule should
be applied retroactively. And the ability to outsource the decision on
retroactivity to another court may make judges more inclined to issue new
legal rules, thereby advancing the law in beneficial ways. We take no position
on the overall question of which approach is best. Both are consistent with the
more general goal of permitting courts to engage in nonretroactive
lawmaking.
In sum, the process for deciding the retroactive effect of patent cases would
mirror the procedure that courts already employ in habeas cases, with only one
salient difference. While new rules of criminal procedure are almost always
made purely prospective in the context of habeas, patent courts would have the
authority to decide whether any new rule should be retroactive.
It is worth noting that the purposes behind the Teague rule even mirror the
purposes of nonretroactive patent law that we describe here. As Justice
Kennedy later explained, the purpose of the Teague rule was to allow federal
239. As we will describe in greater detail below, the Supreme Court has held that courts
may only make a prospective rule if they do not apply the new rule to the parties before
the court. See Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86,97-98 (1993); infra Part IV.D.
Accordingly, a court has only two choices: (1) apply the decision fully retroactively
and prospectively; or (2) apply it only prospectively, and not to the parties in the
current case.
There is a downside to the Supreme Court’s approach. If the courts do not always apply
legal rules to the cases in which they are decided, litigants will have less of an incentive
to argue for legal change, thus slowing the pace of the law’s development. See Malani &
Masur, supra note 26, at 668-69 (analyzing private incentives to produce public goods
through litigation). Litigants might also try harder than usual to frame their arguments
as mere extensions of existing law, rather than as new legal rules, further distorting the
process of argument and decision. In addition, a newly announced legal rule would
technically be mere dicta if it did not apply to the case at hand. Regardless, these are
relatively minor concerns when measured against the potential legal gains from
issuing purely prospective rulings. And until the Supreme Court revisits Harper, it is
not as if the lower courts have any other choice.
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courts to change the law of criminal procedure without overturning thousands
of existing convictions each time they did so.240 If every criminal procedure
decision were necessarily fully retroactive, courts might refrain from making
necessary changes to the law for fear of the consequences.241 And when they
did alter the law, the retroactive harms might outweigh the prospective
benefits. As we have explained, these considerations apply with even greater
force to patent law.242
If a court decides to make a new rule of patent law nonretroactive, the rule
should apply only to patents that were filed after the date of the ruling.243 This
cutoff is to some extent arbitrary—the rule could just as easily be applied to
patents granted after the date of the ruling, or to inventions that were
conceived or reduced to practice or published after the date of the ruling, or
some other such moment in the patent lifecycle. But the filing date is
administratively easy to observe, and it serves as a rough proxy of the moment
when a reliance interest attaches.244 After all, a patent application is drafted to
240. See Wright v. West, 505 U.S. I l l , 307-09 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment).
241. See id.
242. A full evaluation of the Teague rule as applied to habeas is well beyond the scope of this
Article. We pause only to note that every time a court applies Teague in a criminal
procedure case, it creates an injustice by leaving in prison an individual who might
otherwise never have been convicted if the new rule had been in place. For this reason,
there are good arguments for overturning Teague as applied to habeas. No such concern
is present in patent law, of course, where only intellectual property rights—rather than
individuals’ lives and liberty—are at stake.
243. By “filing,” we mean here the regular U.S. filing date, not the priority filing date of the
patent application. In U.S. patent prosecution practice, a “continuation” application can
claim the priority date of a prior provisional or regular U.S. patent application, tracing
that priority back through as many earlier continuation applications as exist in the
patent family. See 4 JOHN GLADSTONE M ills III ET AL., P a t e n t L a w F u n d a m e n t a l s
§ 15:7 (West 2d ed. 2019). When the Federal Circuit or the Supreme Court makes a new
rule, that rule should apply immediately to new patent applications that are filed,
regardless of whether those applications claim priority to applications that were filed
before the new rule. When a firm files a patent application, even a continuation
application, it does so with full knowledge of existing law. Reliance concerns are weak,
even for applications that relate to prior patents. This approach would eliminate
patentees’ ability to game the system by filing for continuation patents years or even
decades after an unfavorable judicial decision. See 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2017) (providing
applicants the right to claim priority to patent applications filed earlier); 4 MILLS ET al .,
supra, § 15:7; see also id. (“Under present practice, there is no limit to the number of prior
applications through which a chain of continuing applications may be traced to obtain
the benefit of the filing date of the earliest of a chain of prior continuing applications.”).
244. Here, too, there is a concern related to symmetry as between patents and firms’
freedom to operate. It is straightforward to make nonretroactive a decision reducing
the scope of patents or patentability. That decision simply has to be held not to apply to
patents that have already been applied for or granted, as described above. It is less
straightforward to make nonretroactive a decision that expands the scope or power of
footnote continued on next page
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comport with existing law, and only the claims can be amended after filing.245
Changes to the law subsequent to the initial application filing can trap the
applicant, to the detriment of that firm and the patent system as a whole.246
2.

Forum-based prospectivity

There is a potential extension of this approach that borrows even more
explicitly from the law of habeas. There are two contexts in which federal
courts consider questions of constitutional criminal procedure: direct review of
criminal convictions and habeas (collateral) review.247 Under Teague, federal
courts are generally barred from applying new legal rules to criminal cases on
habeas review, but they must apply those rules to cases on direct review.248
In addition, Teague generally bars the federal courts from creating new legal
rules in habeas cases 249 Rather, a federal court is only permitted to alter the
law when deciding a case on direct review.
The Federal Circuit similarly considers questions of patent law in two
contexts: appeals fro m th e d istrict co u rts arising o u t o f in frin g em en t litigation

patents. In such a case, the thing that must be protected is a firm’s ability to operate
outside of the realm of patents, rather than existing patents themselves. If a court
decides not to apply a new legal rule to existing patents, that will not necessarily
function as meaningful grandfathering of the existing activity, because there are likely
few relevant existing patents in the first place. Instead, to reinforce the nonretroactive
effects of their decisions, courts should consider issuing new legal rules but delaying
the onset of those rules for a period of several years. These types of “sunrise clauses” are
typical in legislation and regulation. See generally Daniel E. Herz-Roiphe & David Singh
Grewal, Make Me Democratic, but Not Yet: Sunrise Lawmaking and Democratic Constitu
tionalism, 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1975 (2015) (describing the operation of “sunrise” and
“sunset” clauses across a variety of legal domains). It is even relatively common for
courts to use stays of this sort when it is necessary to give the affected parties time
to adjust or prepare to implement a decision. See, e.g., Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933,
934-35,942 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding an Illinois ban on carrying firearms ready for use to
be unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, but staying the mandate for
180 days "to allow the Illinois legislature to craft a new gun law”). Patent courts should
embrace this practice.
245. See Michael Risch, A Brief Defense of the Written Description Requirement, 119 Yale L.J.
Online 127,129-30 (2010).
246. See Schwartz, supra note 67, at 1553-55 (explaining how retroactive patent decisions can
harm patent applicants who have drafted patents with existing law in mind).
247. See Jonathan S. Masur & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Deference Mistakes, 82 U. Chi. L. R ev.
643,667-68 (2015).
248. See W horton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007) (“Under the Teague framework, an
old rule applies both on direct and collateral review, but a new rule is generally
applicable only to cases that are still on direct review.”).
249. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 315-16 (1989) (plurality opinion); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1) (2017) (explaining that habeas relief is unavailable unless the state court’s
decision was contrary to clearly established federal law).
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and challenges to issued patents,250 and direct appeals from patent prosecution
in the PTO.251 Direct appeals from patent prosecutions are analogous to direct
review of criminal cases—the patent has not yet been issued or finalized.252
Appeals of district court litigation and inter partes review have the same flavor
as habeas review, in the sense that they involve collateral attacks on existing
patents.
Accordingly, we could imagine another version of prospectivity that
applies the habeas rules even more strictly to patent law. Under this approach,
the federal courts would be barred from creating new rules of patent law in
appeals from district court infringement litigation, and possibly also in appeals
from inter partes review and ex parte reexamination (the collateral context).
They would be permitted to create new rules only in the context of direct
appeals from PTO decisions in patent prosecutions and in post-grant reviews
(the direct review context). These new rules would then only apply to patents
that are pending before the PTO or filed after the date of the decision.
For example, this approach would have barred the courts from announcing
a new rule of patentability in Ass’n fo r Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc.253 That case arose from district court litigation, which we have
analogized to collateral review.254 But the Federal Circuit or the Supreme Court
could have announced the same rule in connection with an appeal from a denied
patent or a post-grant review.255 The new rule would then apply to any case
appealed directly from the PTO, and to all patents (in litigation and otherwise)
whose applications were filed after the rule was announced.
This approach eliminates much of the judicial discretion embodied in the
procedure we discussed above.255 New rules could only be created in certain
cases, and those new rules would never be applied retroactively to patents that
250. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). We would include in this category appeals from the PTO’s

decisions in inter partes review—a PTO-based proceeding in which a third party can
challenge a patent—because these decisions are so closely connected to litigation.
See S. R ep . N o . 110-259, at 20 (2008) (describing inter partes review as "a quick,
inexpensive, and reliable alternative to district court litigation”); see also 35 U.S.C. § 311
(2017).
251. This includes appeals from frustrated patent applicants whose applications the PTO
has denied. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A).
252. This is not quite true for challenges arising out of post-grant review proceedings,
which involve very recently issued patents. See 35 U.S.C. § 321(c). In those cases,
however, the issue is whether the patent should have been granted in the first place,
and the only questions relate to validity, so it is as if the patent is not yet 'final.
253. 569 U.S. 576 (2013); see supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
254. See M yriad, 569 U.S. at 586.
255. Patents can be challenged for lack of patentable subject matter—the legal issue in
M yriad, see id. at 589-90—in post-grant review. See 35 U.S.C. § 321(b).
256. See supra Part IV.C.l.
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had already been granted and were now the subject of litigation. The advantage
of this alternative lies in the greater certainty it would provide to patent
plaintiffs and defendants regarding when and how the law might be changed.
The parties to a patent litigation would know precisely what legal rules would
apply in their case, and they could be confident that those rules would remain
unchanged.
This alternative comes with downsides, however. The Federal Circuit
hears roughly equal numbers of patent cases on (direct) appeal from the PTO
and on (collateral) appeal from the district courts. (The former figure includes
appeals from inter partes review, which we view as a species of collateral
attack.)257 Barring the Federal Circuit (and the Supreme Court) from making
new legal rules in any case on appeal from the district courts could thus
eliminate significant opportunities for the courts to update the law. Moreover,
many important patent law issues arise only in the context of infringement
litigation—questions related to infringement,258 damages,259 and injunctive
relief,260 among many others. At minimum, therefore, it would be necessary to
permit courts to alter these doctrinal rules in the context of litigation. Finally,
implementing this alternative would require either legislation or new law
from the Supreme Court.261 In contrast, the more discretionary proposal we
described in Part IV.C.l above is permissible under existing Supreme Court
precedent, as we will explain below. For these reasons, we do not necessarily
recommend this alternative approach. We merely present it as a potential
extension of our habeas-based model of prospective judicial lawmaking.

257. See U.S. Courts, Table B-8: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—Appeals Filed,
Terminated, and Pending During the 12-Month Period Ending March 31, 2017 (n.d.),
https://perma.cc/FVF8-TBL9; see also supra note 250.
258. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736-37
(2002) (setting forth the rules for when prosecution history estoppel applies).
See generally Jonathan S. Masur, Patent Liability Rules as Search Rules, 78 U. CHI. L. Rev.
187 (2011) (describing and analyzing rules related to indirect infringement liability).
259. See, e.g., LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Comput., Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 56 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(addressing a number of questions related to patent damages). See generally Erik
Hovenkamp & Jonathan Masur, How Patent Damages Skew Licensing M arkets, 36 Rev.
Litig. 379 (2017) (explaining how the Federal Circuit’s licensing rules affect the use and
value of patents); Masur, supra note 109 (describing and analyzing the Federal Circuit’s
rules on using existing licenses as the basis for assessing patent damages).
260. See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 390-91 (2006) (holding that
patent owners must satisfy a four-factor test in order to obtain an injunction).
261. Under current law, courts are of course permitted to make new legal rules in the
context of patent litigation. See, e.g., M yriad, 569 U.S. at 580, 586 (making new law
governing the patentability of natural substances); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72-73, 75-76 (2012) (making new law governing the
patentability of laws of nature). Congress or the Supreme Court could change this
longstanding rule, but the lower courts could not do it of their own accord.
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D. The Law of Nonretroactivity
Given the many advantages of purely prospective legal change, there are
compelling reasons to permit courts to decide whether to apply their decisions
retroactively. Indeed, the Supreme Court has largely allowed the practice,
subject to one restriction. In a series of cases culminating in Harper v. Virginia
Department o f Taxation, the Court held that when it
applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, that rule is the controlling
interpretation of federal law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases
still open on direct review and as to all events, regardless of whether such events
predate or postdate our announcement of the rule.262

Thus, by implication, courts remain free to issue purely prospective
rulings, so long as they do not apply those rulings to the parties who brought
the case. That might seem at first glance to be a tendentious reading of the
Court’s opinion. But in fact, multiple courts of appeals have interpreted Harper
in precisely this fashion.265 As we noted earlier, the fact that the decision could
not be applied to the parties to the instant lawsuit may dampen litigants’
incentives to raise genuinely new legal theories.264 But this is a marginal
consideration. Far more important is the fact that patent courts currently
possess the authority to render purely prospective decisions in cases that
warrant such an approach.265
The appellate courts’ interpretations to the side, some readers might have
the intuition that allowing courts to make purely prospective legal rules raises
262. 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993); see also James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529,
532-34 (1991) (opinion of Souter, J.) (noting that an earlier holding that interstate
discrimination in alcohol taxes violated the Commerce Clause applied retroactively to
facts antedating the Court’s decision); R ichard H. Fallon, J r. ET al., H art and
W echsler’s T he Federal C ourts and the Federal System 54-55 (7th ed. 2015)
(describing the law of retroactivity).
263. See, e.g., Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, 646 F.3d 684, 690 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) ( [A] court
announcing a new rule of law must decide between pure prospectivity and full
retroactivity....”); Crowe v. Bolduc, 365 F.3d 86,93 (1st Cir. 2004) (“A court in a civil case
may apply a decision purely prospectively, binding neither the parties before it nor
similarly situated parties in other pending cases, depending on the answers to three
questions.”); Glazner v. Glazner, 347 F.3d 1212,1216 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“Although
prospectivity appears to have fallen into disfavor with the Supreme Court, the Court
has clearly retained the possibility of pure prospectivity . . . . (citation omitted)), see also
1 Laurence H. T ribe, American C onstitutional Law § 3-3, at 226 (3d ed. 2000)
(“[T]he Court has not renounced the power to make its decisions entirely prospective, so
that they do not apply even to the parties before it.”). B ut cf. Daniel Hemel, There Is No
Retroactivity Concern w ith Overruling Quill, M edium (Jan. 28, 2018), https://perma.cc
/YH87-MU53 (suggesting that the question whether the Court believes prospectivity is
allowed is somewhat unsettled).
264. See supra note 239.
265. The Court has created a similar rule to govern criminal cases. See Griffith v. Kentucky,
479 U.S. 314,324-25(1987).
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Article III concerns. The idea is that Article III grants the federal courts only
“judicial Power,” not legislative power.266 Judicial power is authority to find, or
interpret, law that has been made by some other body, such as the legisla
ture .267 It does not comprise the power to “make” new law. On this reading,
purely prospective legal rulemaking, in which a court declares that the law is
now different than it was before, would be a constitutionally impermissible
exercise of legislative power.268
Indeed, the language of the Supreme Court’s retroactivity decisions reveals
concerns of this nature. As Justice Thomas wrote for the Court in Harper, ‘“the
nature of judicial review’ strips us of the quintessential^ ‘legislative]’
prerogative to make rules of law retroactive or prospective as we see fit.”269
The Harper majority described this principle as a legal axiom, antecedent to the
Constitution itself, rather than grounded in the Constitution’s text.270 Justice
Scalia’s concurrence expressed a similar sentiment, rooted instead in
Article III.271 In James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, a precursor to Harper,
Justice Scalia had similarly explained:
I am not so naive (nor do I think our forebears were) as to be unaware that judges
in a real sense “make” law. But they make it as judges make it, which is to say as
though they were “finding” it—discerning what the law is, rather than decreeing
what it is today changed to, or what it will tomorrow be.272

Yet this approach to the law does not pose a barrier to nonretroactive
judicial patent decisions, even if it might be seen as barring nonretroactive
decisions in other contexts. Congress passes patent laws under its authority
“Mo promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
266. See U.S. CONST, art. Ill, § 1.
267. On this account, courts merely “find” the law, in the sense that they uncover what the
law means (and has always meant). When a court changes the law, it is merely
correcting past judicial mistakes. It is not actually making new law; that is a legislative
task. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Chi.
L.R ev. 1,65 n.279 (1985) (attributing this view of courts to Blackstone).
268. One could also imagine an argument that a purely prospective decision might raise
concerns that the court is offering an advisory opinion, which would similarly violate
Article III. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 262, at 54-55. But this particular concern has no
force. An advisory opinion is one that does not resolve the case before the court.
A purely prospective new legal rule would still result in a decision that resolved the
case before the court—it would merely do so according to the old legal rule. That would
not constitute an advisory opinion.
269. Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 95 (1993) (alteration in original) (quoting
Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322).
270. See id. at 94.
271. See id. at 106 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The true traditional view is that prospective
decisionmaking is quite incompatible with the judicial power....”).
272. 501 U.S. 529,549 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).

1017

Patents, Property, and Prospectivity
71 Stan. L. Rev. 963 (2019)
Writings and Discoveries.”273 Patent laws exist in order to promote the
progress of science—that is their animating purpose. Accordingly, courts
should interpret patent statutes—which are often written in very general
terms—in light of this constitutional purpose. Of course, as we have noted,
technology and markets change dramatically over time.274 The set of legal
rules that best promoted the progress of science in 1968 may not be especially
effective at promoting progress in 2018, and vice versa. This means that one
interpretation of the patent laws might have been “correct” in 1968, and
another version might be “correct” in 2018, without the text of the law itself
ever having changed. A court that reinterpreted the law in 2018 but did not
apply the new rule retroactively would not be making new law; it would
merely be finding the law as it should be understood in contemporary times.275
It is in this respect that patent law is potentially atypical: The constitutional
provision that authorizes Congress to make law demands that the law be
updated (by Congress or the courts) in a forward-looking manner.
This is particularly true for areas of law that are explicitly driven by
judicial lawmaking. For instance, the Federal Circuit has described the rule that
laws of nature, abstract ideas, and natural phenomena are not patentable
subject matter as a “judicially-crafted exception[].”276 If the courts have the
authority to craft such an exception—and they undoubtedly do—then they
similarly have the authority to apply it only prospectively if they so choose.277
In addition, suppose that the Federal Circuit were to issue a decision in
2018 that changed a particular patent rule from Rule X to Rule Y. Even if the
court were merely finding law, and even if this decision meant that Rule 7 had
always been correct, and Rule A had always been incorrect, this does not mean
273. U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
274. See supra text accompanying note 83.
275. See William Baude, Essay, Is O rigina lism O ur Law?, 115 COLUM. L. Rev. 2349, 2356 (2015)
(“At a most basic level, it does not take any fancy theoretical footwork to see that fixed
texts can harness what seem to be changing meanings. Though the text may have
originally been expected to apply in a particular way to a particular circumstance, that
does not mean that its original meaning always must apply in the same way— This is
because a word can have a fixed abstract meaning even if the specific facts that meaning
points to change over time.”).
276. See Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306,1331 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601-02 (2010) (“The Court’s precedents provide three
specific exceptions to § 101's broad patent-eligibility principles: ‘laws of nature,
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.’ While these exceptions are not required by
the statutory text, they are consistent with the notion that a patentable process must be
‘new and useful.’And, in any case, these exceptions have defined the reach of the statute
as a matter of statutory stare decisis going back 150 years.” (citation omitted) (first
quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); and then quoting 35 U.S.C.
§

101)).

277. We thank Judge Kimberly Ann Moore for suggesting this point to us.
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that the court would be obligated to apply Rule Y retroactively. Federal courts
have the authority to tailor their remedies pragmatically.278 In such a case, the
Federal Circuit could decide that even though the correct rule has always been
Rule Y, it will not apply Rule Y to parties that have already applied for patents
under Rule X. The pragmatic reason would be the reliance interests held by
those parties, the same rationale that animates stare decisis and leads courts to
adhere to potentially suboptimal rules over time.279 Thus, even courts or
scholars who hold a formalistic view of Article III should not balk at the idea of
nonretroactive patent decisions.
What is more, there are good reasons to reject such a formalistic view of
the judicial role. Ever since the legal realists, sophisticated legal observers have
understood that the courts make law, just as legislatures and agencies do.280
The notion that the courts only “find” what law the other branches have made
is a legal fiction that fools few educated observers and is routinely contravened
in public by other judges.281 Perhaps it is politically expedient for courts to
maintain that they do not make new law, but even if so, it is a strategy that is
becoming less and less useful each day.282 More importantly, it lacks the virtue
of being true. As a descriptive matter, this could well be why the Supreme

278. See generally Aaron Tang & Fred 0. Smith Jr., Response, Can Unions Be Sued fo r
Following the Law?, 132 H arv . L. R ev . F. 24 (2018) (responding to William Baude &
Eugene Volokh, The Supreme Court, 2017 Term —C om m ent Compelled Subsidies and the
First Am endm ent, 132 H arv . L. R ev . 171 (2018)) (discussing the courts’ authority to make
prospective rulings, describing why courts might choose to do so, and providing
examples of instances in which courts have effectively made purely prospective rules).
279. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
280. See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM.
L. R ev . 809, 841 (1935) (“[T]he problem of the judge is not whether a legal rule or
concept actually exists but whether it o u g h tto exist.”); Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism
A bout Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 Harv . L. R ev . 1222, 1235-36 (1931)
(responding to Roscoe Pound, The Call fo r a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 Harv . L. R ev . 697
(1931)) (describing as a core realist belief “[t]he conception of law in flux, of moving
law, and of judicial creation of law”).
281. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 81 (2008) (“Appellate judges are
occasional legislators.” (emphasis omitted)).
282. This notion is somewhat akin to Chief Justice Roberts’s famous statement during his
confirmation hearings that his role as a judge was merely to “call balls and strikes,”
a claim that was roundly criticized as disingenuous and implausible. See, e.g., Todd E.
Pettys, The M yth o f the W ritten Constitution, 84 N otre D ame L. R ev . 991, 995, 1047
(2009) (calling Chief Justice Roberts’s analogy “unfortunate”); see also Confirm ation
Hearing on the N om ination o f John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be C h ief Justice o f the U.Sc Hearing Before
the S. Comm, on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.,
Nominee to Be Chief Justice of the United States).
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Court has expressed concern about courts being granted unencumbered
authority to issue prospective or retrospective decisions as they see fit.283 But as
a normative matter, it does not offer grounds for doubting prospective judicial
lawmaking.284
Indeed, the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution effectively requires
prospective judicial lawmaking with respect to substantive criminal law.285
The Ex Post Facto Clause is based upon the principle “that persons have a right
to fair warning of that conduct which will give rise to criminal penalties” and
thus cannot be convicted under a rule of law that did not exist at the time they
engaged in the conduct in question.286 The Clause applies only to Congress, but
the Court has extended and applied the same principle to judicial decisions via
the Due Process Clause.287 This means that any judicial decision that broadens
the scope of criminal liability—by limiting a constitutional protection, for
instance—is necessarily prospective only, applying only to conduct that occurs
after the Court’s decision is announced.288 This of course precisely parallels our
proposed approach to patent law. And here, the legislative nature of purely
prospective judicial rulings has not troubled the Court.
The Court’s view of nonretroactive judicial decisionmaking is also
incongruous with the law of habeas corpus. In the realm of habeas and criminal
procedure, rulings that apply to the parties to the lawsuit but not retroactively
are not merely permitted but required.289 That is, if a criminal defendant on
direct review persuades a court to create a new legal rule, that new legal rule
will always apply to that criminal defendant.290 But it typically will not apply
283. See supra text accompanying note 262.
284. The Harper majority also suggested that applying a rule of decision to the parties in a
case but not retroactively would “violate!] the principle of treating similarly situated
[parties] the same.” Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 95 (1993) (quoting
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987)). But this concern is similarly unfounded.
Similarly situated parties are often treated differently based upon when or where their
cases are heard and adjudicated, with no hint that this might raise constitutional
problems. See Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 359-61, 364-65
(1932) (holding, in a case where the Montana Supreme Court had issued a fully
prospective statutory interpretation ruling, that due process did not demand applica
tion of that ruling to the litigant who had actually obtained it). It is hard to imagine a
reason why differentiation on the basis of litigation timing would be acceptable, but
differentiation on the basis of when the underlying right was created would not be.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

See U.S. CONST, art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188,191-92 (1997).
See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347,362 (1964).
See M arks, 430 U.S. at 192.
See supra notes 227-30 and accompanying text.
See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351 (2004); see also Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288,
302-05 (1989) (plurality opinion) (criticizing the earlier retroactivity regime wherein
new rules were not applied to all cases still pending on direct review).
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retroactively to habeas petitioners who remain in the custody of the state.291
More generally, when the Supreme Court recognizes a rule of criminal
procedure, it must then subsequently declare whether the rule is “new” or
merely derives from an existing rule.292 For a Court that seems invested in the
idea that only legislatures create new, prospective laws, this is an odd
posture.293
Perhaps paradoxically, the “legislative” nature of prospective rules should
serve as a signal of their value, rather than a cause for concern. In areas of law
governed by statute and regulation, policymakers have long benefitted from
the flexibility to create nonretroactive legal rules. Patent law has not enjoyed
this flexibility, precisely because the relevant legal rules are created by judges
rather than legislatures and agencies.294 Yet the federal courts do not lack the
power to make purely prospective legal rules—the Supreme Court has
approved the practice. The federal courts thus suffer not from a failure of

291. See, e.g., Sum m erlin, 542 U.S. at 358.
292. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 311-12 (plurality opinion).
293. It is possible to construct an argument that Teague mirrors how courts address other
areas of law. For instance, if a court decides an employment law case at time ft, and at a
later time f2 the Supreme Court makes a change to employment law doctrine, the first
court will not (and cannot) reopen the decision at That decision is final. This is the
general rule across essentially every area of law. See Thyssenkrupp Steel N. Am., Inc. v.
United States, 886 F.3d 1215, 1223 & n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (describing the general rule of
finality in civil litigation). Thus, if one thinks of a criminal conviction that has become
final on direct review as akin to a final decision in any other legal field, the rule of
Teague regarding nonretroactive criminal procedure rules appears congruent with the
rest of the law. This is because most legal rulings are nonretroactive as to cases that
have already been decided, though not as to conduct that has already occurred.
The flaw in this approach is the formalism of defining a criminal conviction as final
once the prisoner has exhausted his or her direct appeals. In fact, a conviction that is
final on direct appeal is neither legally final—because of the possibility of habeas
relief—nor substantively final—because the prisoner suffers the ongoing harm of
incarceration. Teague only looks like other areas of the law if one artificially defines a
conviction as final when direct appeals are exhausted. Moreover, Teague forces
courts to act in ways that contradict the Supreme Court’s general posture toward
retroactivity, as described in the main text.
294. The rare exceptions are the few patent rules created through regulation by the PTO.
Those rules are frequently only prospective in application. For instance, in October
2018 the PTO announced that it was changing the claim construction standard it would
use in inter partes review, post-grant review, and covered business method proceed
ings. See Changes to the Claim Construction Standard for Interpreting Claims in Trial
Proceedings Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,340, 51,340,
51,358-59 (Oct. 11, 2018) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 42.200). The PTO made the new
rule prospective: It applies only to petitions for review filed on or after November 13,
2018, the effective date of the rule. See id. at 51,340.
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authority, but from a failure of imagination. The time has come for courts to
extend the practice of prospective lawmaking beyond the realm of habeas to
other areas of law.295 Patent law is especially fertile ground for such an
extension.

Conclusion
When the courts alter patent law, they upset existing reliance interests and
undermine the settled expectations of patent owners. This can dissuade firms
from engaging in R&D in the first place and lead to an overall decline in
innovation. Perhaps more importantly, courts are aware of these concerns,
which can make them reluctant to enact significant legal change. Indeed, the
principle of stare decisis is based in part around the idea that courts should
avoid upsetting reliance interests. Courts that fear doing violence to settled
expectations can (and do) stay their hands, to the detriment of the law’s
development.
The solution to this problem is not for courts to refrain from updating the
law. Rather, the solution is for judges to be afforded the authority to make
purely prospective changes to the law, effectively grandfathering existing
patents (or patent-free zones). Doing so would permit brisk legal change
without fear of harming expectation-based investments. And because patents
expire twenty years after filing, “old” patents that have been grandfathered
would soon exit the scene. The U.S. Supreme Court has permitted prospective
decisionmaking in other contexts, despite concerns for its institutional
reputation. The time has come for lower courts—and the Federal Circuit in
particular—to accept the Supreme Court’s invitation. Patent law and its
stakeholders stand to benefit greatly from the change.

295. Indeed, habeas itself may in many respects be a poor candidate for nonretroactive
rulings. See Kendall Turner, Note, A New Approach to the Teague Doctrine, 66 STAN.
L. R ev. 1159, 1171-75 (2014) (criticizing the application of Teague in many habeas
contexts).
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